(Continued from p.7)
regime since August 1995. Arafat, Iraq's Saddam, and Syria's Assad grasped Jordan's increased isolation and weakness and together moved to undermine the Jordanian regime and foment civil war. Specifically, the PLO moved toward closer cooperation with Iran in early summer 1997, in addition to more openly cultivating its never-severed alliance with Saddam. This strategic development found its clearest public expression in August when Arafat both called for an alliance of Syria, PLO, Iran, and Iraq to confront Israel and Turkey, as well as hosted a conference in which he embraced the Palestinian Islamic opposition responsible for the recent terror wave in Israel.As the PLO, which never severed its close ties to Iraq, labors to cobble together a new, anti-American regional bloc, Syria and Iraq draw closer to each other as well. Recently, high-ranking Iraqi officials visited Damascus, the first such visit in decades. Israel, Jordan and Turkey have displayed some understanding recently (Jordan starting in late 1995; Israel and Turkey in 1996) of the importance of influencing Iraq's eventual disposition and forming a counter-bloc to avoid isolation and
Israel is poised to become one pillar anchoring the West's strategic interests in the region, protecting itself, and helping the West protect other regional spots of economic interest.
The strategic competition is also attracting Russia's interest and intervention. Russia's prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, has launched a fairly effective effort to help Saddam obstruct the inspections regime in recent crises. This effort should be understood as part of a larger Russian strategic initiative to challenge the United States' position in the region. For two years, Russia has been active in trying not only to arm, but also to forge a strategic bloc of nations along a thousand-mile strategic arc from Serbia, Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, in large part to isolate Turkey. These Russian- Arab efforts to isolate Turkey have recently accelerated, and have been assisted by the European Union's antagonistic policies toward Turkey, which reduce Turkey's ties to the West to NATO alone.
Russia casts a heavy shadow over central Asia, and entered cooperative talks with Iran to help dominate the region. It continues to maintain contact with Iraq, and has tightened its relations with Syria. In short, Russia is poised to assert a dominant role over all Middle Eastern and central Asia oil.
The possibility of a Russian-Iranian strategic partnership, supplemented by Syrian and Iraqi participation, would alter the global balance of power by effectively creating a new hegemonic power structure around vital raw materials. Former KGB Chief, and current Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primokov has based Russia's emerging security architecture with China, trans-Caucasus and Iran upon an understanding of the vulnerability of the West, and Europe in particular, to extortion and blackmail over energy supply. Potential threat factors arising from the disruption of oil flow, the southward extension of the Russian nuclear umbrella, and confrontation with America's regional allies presents a variety of diplomatic, economic and military options by which Russia and Iran can further their national security objectives. A Western security structure anchored to an Israeli-Turkish-Jordanian alliance can effectively sabotage the consolidation of Russia's emerging oil-producing monopoly and challenge Russia's reemerging Middle Eastern infiltration.
Iraq is the geo-political pivot of these two regional blocs. The eventual alignment of Iraq over the long run will determine which of these two blocs will prevail and dominate the region. The direction in which this competition develops will sway fence-sitters, eager to divine and align with winners, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others.
The opportunity lies in the fact that this current axis of Iraq, Syria, the PLO, and Iran while formidable on paper, can be easily challenged. No better example of this could be seen than in Syria's feeble resistance to Turkey's demand that it expel the Kurdish PKK terrorist organization's leader, Abadallah Ocalan, from its territory. While for years, Syria balked and dismissed such Turkish demands, in fall 1998, Turkey threatened Syria with war. Facing the prospect of such a war, Syria promptly buckled and expelled Ocalan. Syrian president Assad's much vaunted toughness and stubbornness melted rapidly when faced with the threat of a real military threat to Syria itself.
Even Syrian leaders are quite candid about their own weakness if Turkey, Israel and Jordan pursued their alliance with resolve. Consider, for example, the following three statements by Syria's Vice President Khaddam:
* "Damascus believes that Jordan plays a major role with regard to establishing a 'natural axis' with central Iraq on one side and Israel on the other, which would isolate Syria from the Arabian peninsula and squeeze it between this axis in the south and Turkey in the north. Damascus fears that this could be the prelude to a redrawing of the map of the Middle East along sectarian, religious, linguistic, and ethnic lines, which would threaten Syria's territorial integrity."
* "If an axis of Israel, Turkey and Jordan came into existence, it would be a threat not only to Syria alone, but it would be a threat to the entire Arab nation; it would also harm Islamic states."
(Continued on p.10)
Outpost - 8 - May 1999