(Editor's note: It is remarkable and unfortunate that some of the best analysis of the Israeli political scene comes from the Organization for Democratic Action, the most militantly anti-Israel of the three Arab parties running for the Knesset. It accuses the other two Arab parties of being patsies for Labor and excoriates Oslo as a sell-out to the Jews because it anticipates that Arafat will wind up with less than 100% of Judea and Samaria. It is also critical of the Palestinian Authority's corruption and cronyism. The party calls for casting a blank ballot for the post of prime minister, in the absence of an Arab non-Zionist candidate. The following are excerpts from the party's position paper, published in Challenge magazine.)
The stalemate between Likud and Labor remains unbroken on the surface, while underneath there is almost wall-to-wall consensus. The stalemate was deep in 1993, when Yitzhak Rabin went to Oslo in order to break it. He distinguished in his thinking between right-wing moderates, who wanted to keep the Occupied Territories for the sake of security, and right-wing extremists, with their dream of a "greater Israel." Oslo was supposed to provide security--a dependent Arafat, it was thought, would hold his people under control-- while demolishing the possibility of a greater Israel. Rabin hoped thus to attract the moderates to Labor's side, while turning the extremists into dinosaurs. In the latter task he succeeded--few Israelis today would want to re-occupy Gaza or even the West Bank cities. But Oslo failed to provide security, and Rabin fell victim to a right-wing bullet.
In the elections of 1996, "greater Israel" was no longer an option. While the people remained divided between Likud and Labor, the issue was no longer whether to give up land for peace, but how much and how fast. Here Bibi Netanyahu made a nimble dancer. Seeing the ideological rug disappear, he stepped toward Oslo--wooing the emerging consensus--while letting the right-wing believe he was not really serious. He slipped into power on a razor-thin margin, touting "Peace with Security."
Netanyahu was able to remain in power, supported by rightwingers and moderates alike, as long as both read his intentions differently, each to its liking. Yet he knew he could not remain ambiguous. He wanted to be the one to make the final arrangement with the Palestinians. To ensure re-election, he would have to show progress on Oslo. When at last he moved in this direction, signing the Wye Memorandum, the right wing was disillusioned, and Bibi had to call new elections.
The last twenty-odd years of Israeli politics have been determined by the stalemate between Likud and Labor and by attempts on both sides to break it. That stalemate is still there. The society remains split down the middle. Yet curiously, it is no longer split on the question of what to do, rather--and with bitter ferocity--on the question of who should do it.
The Wye Memorandum is the most significant political statement ever made by the moderate Right in Israel. Like the earlier redeployment in Hebron, it shows that Netanyahu was basically serious in proclaiming "Peace with Security." In deference to his electoral base, he dragged his feet. He sorely tried the patience of the U.S. and the Palestinians.
He knew, however, that by the end of his term he must lay the basis for the final agreement--else Labor would be elected to do so. It was not mere recalcitrance, then, that led to his setback. While he was still at Wye, Labor's Ehud Barak--who had promised him parliamentary support in matters of peace--began flirting with the National Religious Party (Mafdal) in an effort to undermine him. Why did Barak do this? It seems he had not believed that Netanyahu would go as far as Wye. He didn't want Bibi to be the one who reaped the harvest of peace.
Netanyahu saw his right wing teeter. After returning from Wye, therefore, he slowed the implementation of the agreement. Barak used the delay as a pretext to end parliamentary support. Deserted by the hard Right on one side and by Barak on the other, there was nothing left for the PM to do but call new elections. If Labor had really given Netanyahu a safety net for the Wye Memorandum, he and Arafat might have been well into the final-status talks by now.
Judging from Bibi's actions so far, there is no evidence for the horror stories, promulgated by the Israeli Left, that he aims to abolish Oslo. Why is this fact important? It shows that both of Israel's political camps are united behind Oslo. The latter seems a fait accompli. The extreme right wing is isolated, just as Rabin foresaw. Apart from it, all factions--from the Arab parties to Netanyahu--accept Oslo as the only possible mechanism for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If almost everyone agrees, however, why hold early elections? The issue is power, power for its own sake, though the opposition parties varnish this by calls for a "credible leader." After the elections, a precondition for staying in power will be progress on the "peace front." The dynamics of the situation are such, however, that no prime minister will be able to move forward on Oslo--much less negotiate the final-status accord--except through a national-unity government. If Netanyahu wins, in the
(Continued on p.11)
Outpost - 8 - March 1999