(Continued from p.3)
fearlessly. The platforms of both Arab parties in 1996 reflected their radicalization: in addition to calling for a PLO state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the dismantling of all Jewish settlements, they called for Israel to become "a state for all its citizens," i.e. to cease being a Jewish state. And in 1996 the votes for these parties almost doubled, their Knesset strength going from five to nine seats. In the forthcoming elections, given the sharply growing size of the Arab electorate, they are almost certain to gain seats.More worrisome, the ostensibly Zionist party Meretz (itself formed by an odd trio of the old far-Left Mapam Party, the "good-government" Shinui party and the anti-religious and pro-feminist Citizens Rights Movement), which was Labor's chief coalition partner following the 1993 elections and won a substantial 9 seats in 1996, in the coming elections is coordinating its platform with the Arab party Hadash. In effect, Meretz is becoming a Jewish anti-system party.* This is highly significant because now, for the first time, the anti-system parties will be transformed into "relevant" parties. Traditionally, the Arab parties had only a few Knesset members (most Arabs voted for Jewish parties) and they were not "relevant" in Sartori's sense, i.e. neither party would consider making them part of the ruling coalition, giving them minimal blackmail potential. But there will be no way a ruling coalition can ignore a bloc with 20 or more Knesset seats. Thus, parties whose goal is abolishing the state of Israel as it exists today, a Jewish state open to Jews worldwide, stand to become an influential force in her governance.
As the anti-system parties gain dramatically, the two major parties, Likud and Labor, seem fated to de-
* Meretz's decision no doubt in part reflects its dependence upon the Arab vote. Nearly half of its 9 seats in 1996 came from Arab voters; astonishingly, the kibbutzim were its other main source of strength--31% of the kibbutz vote went to Meretz. Given that Meretz, even in 1996, called for statehood for the Palestinians and complete separation of the state from Judaism, the grandchildren of Zionist pioneers were now in the vanguard of those turning their back on Zionism.
The very notion of a "center" party is absurd. If Likud is no different from Labor, where is the ideological space for a "center" between them? All that the new party offers is an opportunity for politicians dissatisfied with their role in their present party to assume a larger role in the new one. And precisely because there is nothing to distinguish the new party from Labor (indeed, when it comes to Oslo, Lipkin-Shahak is reputed to be to the left of Labor chief Ehud Barak), it is likely to cut into Labor's strength as much, if not more, than it cuts into that of the Likud. However well it may do in its electoral debut, because it is an incoherent party, assembled of people with contradictory ideologies and agendas, the new "center" party will inevitably disintegrate once decisions have to be made on specific issues. It has no more chance to cohere than the very similar Shinui ("Change"), the "good-government" party that burst on the scene following the debacle of the Yom Kippur War with another general, Yigal Yadin, at its head. Today it is a forgotten remnant buried in the anti-Zionist Meretz.
The religious parties too show signs of further splits. The National Religious Party (NRP), in particular, is in danger of dissolving into three parties, one (Meimad) strongly supporting Oslo and the most recent Wye agreement, the old NRP in the middle, unhappy
(Continued on p.5)
Save the Date ... Save the Date ... Save the DateAmericans For a Safe Israel
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Outpost - 4 - January 1999