The Western world celebrated the Munich Agreement of 1938 as "peace in our time." Today, the West wants to celebrate peace between Israel and Syria as "the final requirement for lasting peace in the Middle East." For Israel, it would be the peace of the grave.
Syria will not sign a peace treaty leaving Israel the Golan Heights. Israel is not defensible without the Golan Heights. Most Western generals and military experts hold the view expressed in the 1967 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum signed by General Wheeler: Israel must retain the Golan Heights to assure a defensible line protecting Northern Galilee and essential water resources. Some Left-wing political generals in Israel were and are ready to cede all or part of these 540 square miles (about 15 miles wide and 42 miles from North to South.) But this proves only that their minds are preoccupied with advancement to lucrative positions in the Israel Labor Party establishment upon retirement. For the Golan Heights are essential not only to defend Israel and deter Arab attacks--including conventional missile attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa--but also to assure the continued existence of the strategic alliance with Turkey and of the interest Jordan has in Israel's survival.
The Golan Heights plateau completely dominates the upper Jordan valley and the Sea of Galilee. The mountains of the Golan watershed hug the present Syrian border. They reach a height of 2,900 feet in the South, 3,900 feet in the Center and 7,100 feet in the North, providing essential observation posts, radar and excellent firing positions covering large areas of Syria. These are invaluable defensively, offensively and, last but no least, for deterrence of a concerted Arab attack. Had Syria's 1973 Yom Kippur aggression started from the pre-1967 border, it would have overrun most of Galilee, making Israel dependent on Syria for water. Syria remembers that at the end of this war the Israel army was near Damascus. Since 1973, the Syrian armed forces have tripled their strength. Today, they cannot be repulsed without the Golan Heights watershed. And the Arabs know that international opposition to the use of nuclear weapons might well prevent any Israeli Government anxious to please Washington from using them.
The only regional states with an interest in Israel's survival are Turkey and Jordan. In both cases this interest will disappear immediately Israel cedes the Golan to Syria. Turkey has had a secular, anti-Islamic Government for more than six decades. Syria has been its bitter enemy ever since it achieved independence. It is still providing bases for anti-Turkish terrorist movements on Syrian and Lebanese territory, where they are trained and equipped. It claims the Turkish province of Iskanderun. It even wants more Turkish water. The Turkish armed forces are strong and their morale is high. However, Israel can offer them technological upgrades and--for as long as it holds the Golan only--a second front tying up large Syrian forces in the event of war. Needless to say, for as long as it believes Israel is serious about the alliance, Turkey will also tie up Syrian and Iranian forces.
Ankara has made it very clear that it does not want Israel to cede the Golan Heights. Any strategist worth his salt whose mind is uncorrupted by U.S. propaganda understands that Israel's strategic value to Turkey drops to zero if it signs a peace treaty with territorial concessions to Syria. The Turkish policy-makers certainly do. But this is not all. The Israeli alliance is a cornerstone of Turkey's ability to stand up to the Arab world, which in turn discourages the spread of Islamic fundamentalism within Turkey's borders. An Israel peace treaty with Syria making the Jewish state virtually dependent on the goodwill of its Arab neighbors or doubtful U.S. readiness to come to its defense will certainly spark a reevaluation of Turkey's foreign policy and strengthen Turkey's Islamic movements. Even if it does not terminate the rule of secularism, Ankara will have no good options besides a pro-Arab policy.
Israel's value to Jordan depends on its readiness and ability to protect the Hashemite regime from hostile military attacks--be they Syrian, Iraqi or PLO. Jerusalem has a good record in this respect. One of the side--effects has been Jordan's tacit approval of the Israel-Turkey alliance. A peace treaty with Syria will eliminate the strategic benefit Jordan reaps from Israel's existence. Again, the likely result will be that it is forced to join Israel's enemies.
To sum up: After "making peace" in Kosovo, NATO may or may not intend to bomb Israel unless it cedes the Golan Heights. Even if it does, Israel should refuse to "make peace" with Syria. But quietly warning NATO that the cost would be prohibitive and there will be no surrender might well lead to second thoughts in London, Paris, Bonn and Washington.
Yohanan Ramati is chairman of the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defence.
Outpost - 8 - April 1999