Gamaliel Isaac
For negotiations to succeed, there are certain basic requirements. A successful negotiation requires that once an agreement is made, it is either enforceable or both sides have a strong incentive to adhere to the agreements they make. The enforcement mechanism could take the form of a provision that if one side violates the agreements, the other side can take back what it has given. Or enforcement could involve a tangible transaction that cannot be undone without strong penalties to either side. To be equitable, a negotiating process requires that if one side fails to meet its agreements, the opposing side ceases to make concessions.
There is an inherent problem with Israeli-PLO negotiations, namely, the nature of the quid pro quo. The negotiation consists of land for promises. Israel will give land to the Arabs if the Arabs promise, in return, to be peaceful. But although land is a tangible object, promises are not. Promises can be broken, but once land is given away it requires war to take it back. What would happen if Israel were to attempt to take back land from the PLO? Egypt has already announced it would come to the aid of the PLO. The Arab countries who joined the PLO in fighting Israel would have the world's backing since Israel would be seen as the aggressor.
What would happen if the PLO breaks its promises? Nothing has so far! If Israel stalls in making territorial withdrawals in response, the world comes down on Israel for holding up the "peace process." In July, Holland criticized Israel for failing to distribute mini-Ingram submachine guns to the PLO. Why is Holland sending (as a gift!) submachine guns to the PLO? For peace? Holland claims Israel's failure to distribute the guns is a violation of the Hebron agreement. Never mind that the Palestinian Authority has grossly violated every single paragraph of their obligations under that agreement. Moreover, when Israel drags its feet in meeting Arafat's ever-increasing demands, the PLO threatens violence which in turn encourages the appeasement-prone Clinton administration and European governments to pressure a panic-stricken Israeli government to make even more concessions. Members of the Israeli government constantly speak about the looming catastrophe if concessions are not made, so they make more and more, creating a more and more powerful and arrogant PLO and a larger and larger looming catastrophe. The Israelis have created a monster which they themselves feel they must constantly feed lest it consume them.
What incentive does the PLO have to stick to
its agreements? Its only incentive is that Israel might
not give it more land if it violates them. But a timorous
Israel keeps making concessions anyway. The PLO is better
better off violating its agreements so as to preserve
its bargaining chips. One of those bargaining chips is
the Palestinian Covenant, which calls for Israel's
destruction. The PLO formally promised to change the
covenant in 1993 in return for Israeli recognition. Indeed,
Shimon Peres, in The New Middle East, wrote that without
that undertaking there would have been no Oslo agreement.
But five years later, the PLO still has not done so
and continues to dangle the promise of changing the
Covenant as a price for further Israeli territorial and
other concessions. If the PLO had changed the
covenant when it promised, it would no longer have the
covenant as a bargaining chip. Rather than having strong
incentives to stick to its agreements, the PLO thus has
strong incentives to violate them. If the Israeli government
balks at making more concessions, the PLO can count on
the collapse of Israeli will in the face of threats of
violence and threats that the peace process will end.
In most negotiations, the negotiating
partners start out with more demands than they actually
expect to be fulfilled by the other side. They then reduce
their demands as the negotiation progresses until they
reach an agreement. This is typical of negotiations
ranging from street vendors selling their wares in the
outdoor markets of every city in the world, up to corporate and
political negotiations. In the case of the
Israeli-Arab peace negotiations, however, the Arabs have
established a pattern of each time escalating their
demands during the negotiations. Sometimes they go further
and create facts on the ground. In July, for example, the
PA blockaded Israeli communities in the Gaza region
and the Israelis had to make further concessions to
reopen the roads. The incentive for the PLO is to escalate
demands and violate agreements in order to get
further concessions from the Israelis, who, in order to avoid
a violent eruption, continue to give in.
Why did the Israelis embark upon such a flawed negotiation process and why have they allowed it to continue? Most Israelis were sold on Oslo as an experiment. Then-Prime Minister Rabin and other Labor leaders assured them that if the PLO fulfilled its commitment to be a "partner in peace" the process would go further, and if the PLO reneged on its commitments, the process was reversible. In other words, Israelis were told that with their vastly greater military power, they could easily take back what they gave away. But as should have been obvious, given international political realities, this was not the case. Unwilling to face up to their own gullibility--or, to be blunt, downright stupidity --most Israelis would rather cling to the delusion that
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Outpost - 8 - September 1998