Steven Plaut
(This is the second part--the first appeared
in the April 1998 issue of Outpost--of Haifa
professor Steven Plaut's analysis of the parallel between
Czechoslovakia's situation prior to World War II
and Israel's today.)
After coming to power, Hitler turned the issue of Sudeten national rights into his chief instrument for military aggression. The Nazi propaganda machine shifted into high gear, alleging widespread violations of the human rights of Sudeten Germans by the Czechoslovakian authorities. Nazi funds flowed into the coffers of the SdP. Germany ominously warned of the existence of imaginary Soviet airfields in Czechoslovakia, much as the Arabs were to "discover" imaginary American airfields In Israel in 1967. Germany labeled Czechoslovakia "a puppet of Soviet imperialism," just as the Arabs were to label Israel a puppet and instrument of American imperialism. But the most important part of the Nazi propaganda assault on Czechoslovakia was the denunciation of the supposed torture and physical abuse of Sudeten Germans at the hands of Czechoslovakia--this from the nation that was already building concentration camps.
By the summer of 1937, Hitler was simultaneously pressuring Prague to make concessions on the Sudeten issue and completing his military plan for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The head of the SdP, Konrad Heinlein, went on a diplomatic offensive, touring the Western capitals and demanding that Sudeten rights be acknowledged. A Sudeten Arafat, Heinlein at first attempted to convince the European governments that his ambitions were limited to autonomy for Sudeten Germans. Yet his statements became increasingly belligerent. There is no German equivalent for "jihad," or Heinlein would have used it,.
On January 1, 1938, Heinlein said: "The Czechoslovakian people must recognize that no settlement will ever be reached with our great neighbor, Germany, until the Sudeten Germans are satisfied." In 1938 the SdP adopted the Carlsbad Eight Points. This manifesto, considerably more moderate than the still-unrenounced Palestinian National Covenant of the PLO, essentially called for the partitioning of Czechoslovakia and the secession of the Sudetenland to Germany. Unlike the PLO National Covenant, the SdP position seemed to leave open the possibility of coexistence with a truncated Czechoslovakian state after such a "redeployment" would take place.
An internal problem involving minority
"rights" quickly assumed international dimensions.
Responding to Nazi protests, the Western powers began
pressuring Prague to accede to Sudeten demands. As early
as July 1936, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign
Minister, urged Czechoslovakia to grant the Sudeten
Germans full autonomy. Heinlein visited London a number
of times and received official welcomes of a kind
usually reserved for heads of state, much like the
near-universal crowning of Arafat by the world's political
leaders decades later.
The Czech historian Radomir Luza contrasted these honors thrust upon Heinlein with the London reception for Czechoslovakian President Benes, whom he says was treated "more cavalierly than if he had been the chief of a tribe in Africa." Had he been alive today, Luza might have said, "Almost like a Netanyahu."
Following the Austrian Anschluss, mass support for the SdP among the Sudeten Germans grew, along with violence and mass demonstrations against Czechoslovakia. Heinlein escalated the war of rhetoric and violence in the streets, denouncing the Prague regime as "Hussite-Bolshevik criminals" (compare Arab utterances about the "Zionist imperialist criminals"). Threats from the Third Reich assumed a more ominous tone. Reports arrived of German troop concentrations near the
After coming to power, Hitler turned the issue of Sudeten national rights into his chief instrument for military aggression.
Responding to Western pressures, the Czechoslovakian leaders agreed to negotiate with the SdP, and proposed their own program for limited autonomy. The SdP, under orders from Hitler, rejected the plan peremptorily. London repeatedly pressured Prague to sweeten the plan and to agree to a Sudeten plebiscite, even though it was obvious that such a plebiscite would lead to the partition of Czechoslovakia.
Against the mood of appeasement, a few Western protests were voiced, but generally ignored. William Srang, head of the Central European Department of the British Foreign Office, warned: "Even if there were not a single German in Czechoslovakia, the root problem of German-Czechoslovakian relations would remain, viz., a Slav state thrust into the heart of Germany ... The German government ... (is) using the Sudeten German question as an instrument of policy to strengthen (its)
(Continued on p.4)
May 1998 - 3 - Outpost