THE FUTURE OF THE OSLO ACCORDS Marc Baker Israel has been negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization since the Oslo process officially began on September 13, 1993, with the now-famous handshake on the White House lawn between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat. Since then, hundreds of Israelis have been killed in the ongoing terrorist war against Israel, Mr. Rabin has been assassinated, and in response to Israel's September 1996 decision to open a second exit to the Jerusalem tunnel, the PLO police attacked and killed 16 Israelis. Mr. Arafat, for his part, has continued to incite violence against Israel and, in addition to reneging on his promise to change the PLO's anti-Israel charter, which calls for Israel's destruction, he has failed to seriously fulfill any of his responsibilities vis a vis the Oslo accords. Rather, any time Prime Minister Netanyahu's government asserts its sovereignty, by building apartments or enhancing archaeologically significant sites, Mr. Arafat and the unsympathetic international media ignore Palestinian Arab violations and proceed to depict Israel as the "obstacle to peace." Consequently, the implementation of the Oslo accords has put Israel on the defensive, and, as a result, Israel has virtually given up expecting the PLO to comply with the accords. Thus, Mr. Arafat has not used his Israeli supplied weapons to fight terrorism, as Shimon Peres envisioned, and the international goodwill Israel was to have earned has not materialized. Rather, the accords have exacerbated international impatience with Israeli policy. The question remains: if the quality of life of the average Israeli has deteriorated since Oslo began, why does Israel, especially under the stewardship of Mr. Netanyahu, insist on continuing to participate in a process that seemingly does not offer Israel any benefits? Mr. Rabin's assassination and Mr. Netanyahu's election were a reaction to the refusal of Messrs. Rabin and Peres to demand a quid pro quo from Mr. Arafat before Israel made any further territorial withdrawals. Early on, the PLO realized that they could increase their international stature and gain territory, while refusing to implement their obligations. It was thought, based on Mr. Netanyahu's campaign rhetoric, that once elected, he would ensure Mr. Arafat's compliance. However, after a three-month period following Mr. Netanyahu's election, when he refused to meet with Mr. Arafat, Mr. Netanyahu began implementing the accords without demanding any preconditions from Mr. Arafat. It was as if Mr. Netanyahu, in the process of attempting to prove to his critics that he is as dedicated to peace as Israel's leftists, has abandoned the principle of reciprocity. The climax of Mr. Netanyahu's inability to change the pattern of the negotiations, such that Israel would no longer be the only participant making risky sacrifices, was the tepid Israeli response to the September 1996 violence.

Rather than punishing Mr. Arafat, he was rewarded with an Israeli withdrawal from most of Hebron and promises of future withdrawals only three months after the tunnel attacks. Thus, Mr. Netanyahu has not been able to break out of the Rabin/Peres cycle of refusing to demand Palestinian reciprocity as a precondition for further negotiations. The stumbling block to halting these asymmetrical negotiations, and Israel's inability to recognize how her refusal to insist on PLO reciprocity contributes to her own strategic vulnerability, are both due to her obsession with international support. Ignoring PLO violations, especially Israeli fatalities caused by PLO policemen, projects an Israeli ambivalence regarding the justice of their cause. In the meantime, the Arab world has become an astute observer of the Israeli sociopolitical scene. It was their determination to study Israeli society, in order to reverse the humiliating Arab defeat of the 1967 war, that led to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This, in t urn, led to Egypt's insightful calculation on the eve of the 1973 war that Israel would not launch another 1967-style pre-emptive attack, for fear of international condemnation. Similarly, the contrived September attack by the PLO was a test case to see if Israel would defy world opinion by retaking Palestinian areas and/or confiscating their weapons. Thus, the Arabs have successfully turned each military defeat and negotiation into a strengthening of the Arab strategic position. By convening an international conference regarding Har Homa without inviting Israel and using the sympathetic international media to their advantage, the PLO, in collusion with the Arab world, is purposefully exacerbating and manipulating Israel's fear of international isolation. It is this fear which allows (Continued on p.10)  PLEASE NOTE Americans For a Safe Israel (AFSI) has moved its national headquarters to: 1623 Third Ave. (at 92nd St.) - Suite 205 New York, NY 10128 Please also note our NEW telephone and fax numbers: phone:  212-828-2424 fax:  212-828-1717 Our e-mail and web site addresses remain: e-mail:  afsi@interport.net web site:  http://www.afsi.org/afsi Please contact us at our new home. Your comments, suggestions, and questions are always welcome.

Outpost               - 8 -               June 1997