PEACE DOES NOT MEAN SECURITY (Continued from p.3) to war." It was a terrible shock for the Norwegians. In the words of Carl Hambro, President of the Norwegian Parliament: What stupified the Norwegians more than the act of aggression itself was the national realization that a great Power, for years professing its friendship, suddenly appeared a deadly enemy...More than by the violation of treaties and every international obligation, the people of Norway were dazed to find that for years their German friends had been elaborating the most detailed plans for the invasion and subsequent enslaving of their country. 4 IRAN AND IRAQ Unlike Germany and Norway, historical Iraqi and Iranian national and religious differences brought about a treaty, delivering benefits to both countries. Relations continued to improve following the 1975 treaty. Oil production, the lifeblood of both, promised economic well-being and the two countries were able to cooperate in efforts to boost oil prices within OPEC. Peace was the key to a better future. All this ended with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iran now sought regional dominance through the export of a Shi'ite fundamentalist revolution. Iraq, hoping to fill a leadership vacuum in the Arab world, viewed Iran as a threat to its secular, multi-ethnic state. Its army divided, Iran appeared vulnerable. Iraq was ready to redress the territorial grievances created by the 1975 agreement. In September 1980, Iraqi troops crossed the Iranian border. ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS Folly begins when national security rests on the childish premise that peace is eternal. In 1925, with the signing of the Locarno pact, the New York Times boldly proclaimed, "France and Germany Bar War Forever." The headline was indicative of a period when the French and British, sickened by the horrors of war, were blind to

reality. Many were obsessed with the belief that rhetorical adherence to peace was the cure for war. The historical record proves that peace today is no guarantee for the future. Peace along with respect for sovereignty and borders are, as they have always been, subject to shifting currents. Power and self-interest determine adherence to treaties and relations between states. History shows that countries prepared for war are more likely to prevent one. For almost half a century, the United States avoided war with the Soviet Union. Americans, believing that "Strength is my security," assembled the most formidable military force the world has ever known. Its strategic depth reached deep below the ocean's surface and into the skies. This massive deterrent, not an unsubstantiated, uncertain belief in peace, provided security--and kept the peace. Israel will ensure the security of its people and national survival in the same way. Arab acceptance is based on the realization that Israel is too strong to destroy militarily. Peace can exist only so long as this perception predominates. Therefore, instead of weakening itself by reductions in its armed strength and the ceding of geostrategic territory, Israel must maintain a powerful military, based on its air, missile and combined land forces, the qualitative superiority of each ensured through adequate investment in research and development. However, just as quality must never be employed to diminish quantity, technological advances cannot be used as an excuse to reduce territorial depth. Israel's miniscule width is already a strategic nightmare. Only those who believe in the fantasy of "Peace is my security," or that the economic well-being of potential enemies guarantees peace, are ready to minimize even further the country's strategic depth by acceding to Arab demands to relinquish land. The Gulf War of 1991 is only the most recent evidence that the outcome of war is still determined by armor, artillery and infantry. This means that depth and geographic barriers to invasion continue to assume great strategic importance, making the Golan Heights, Judea and Samaria crucial to Israel's defense. Strategic depth will have to be broadened. The nation's defense will be seriously challenged in the not too-distant future when one or more Arab countries and Iran will possess nuclear weapons. Because of its tiny area, Israel will not be able to respond following a first strike if it relies only on land based nuclear weapons. It should, therefore, be prepared to expand its strategic deterrence to missile carrrying submarines. Israel's security depends on the perception that the cost to potential aggressors is not one they are willing to pay. In 1908, Neville Chamberlain opined that "treaties are not to be depended on for keeping the peace...we have got to make ourselves too strong to be attacked." 5 In light of the tragic results which followed the British prime minister's behavior in the 1930s, how ironic yet (Continued on p.12)

Outpost               - 8 -               October 1996