An Interview with Douglas Feith (Continued from p.8) condemning the Soviets, said, "Well, the violations aren't so clear. They aren't so important or they are not really violations. Things would be worse if we didn't have the agreement," -- statements of that type. You had a similar phenomenon when Menachem Begin concluded his agreement with the Egyptians. He did not have a political incentive to blast the Egyptians for violating the agreement. On the contrary, he had a political incentive for saying the agreement, notwithstanding the Egyptian violations, was a great success. Outpost: Netanyahu is not quite in that position because Oslo was not his agreement and he has been criticizing it from the beginning. So he can use compliance. Feith: He can use compliance as a strong theme, as he did in his speech to Congress. It was the second of his three pillars of peace. Reciprocity was the term he used to describe his insistence on compliance. The thing to watch for, of course, are any agreements Netanyahu himself might achieve, because he will be under the same kind of pressure that any democratic government is under to preserve the appearance of success, even if the other side is violating them. Outpost: You have said diplomacy can be used as a sword. How can you do that in this case? Feith: Somebody asked me if Netanyahu will be trapped by the Oslo agreements, and I said he can use the Oslo agreements as a sword or as a tool. He can do this by emphasizing that Israel is entitled to a number of important actions and concessions from the Arabs as a result of the Oslo agreements and the compliance issues are very serious. Democratic governments do succeed to the legal, and in some cases political, commitments of their predecessors. And so the Netanyahu government does not have the option of saying that because we would not have entered into the Oslo agreements we are not bound by them. That's simply not the way democratic governments work, or should work. They have to recognize that they step into the shoes of their predecessors and in Israel's case that covers whatever obligations apply to the Israeli government under Oslo. Nevertheless, they also step into their shoes with respect to the rights that the Israeli government has to insist on Arab compliance. The Israeli government inherits the right to declare that the Oslo agreement was very seriously violated by the PLO, and perhaps is not even in effect anymore as a result. In other words, all those rights and options exist for them, but they exist within the context that they are the successor government, and they don't start with a clean slate. The Netanyahu government can operate within the framework of Oslo, but change the policy about overlooking violations and put to the top of the agenda the issue of ensuring that Israel gets everything it was promised.

Outpost: The whole thing would break down at that point. Can you imagine the PLO handing over Hamas terrorists to Israel? Feith: One of the very interesting questions here is if, in the view of the Arabs, the Oslo agreement was really premised on an understanding that they were not going to have to comply. If so, it might break down if the Israelis insist on compliance. I don't think the blame for the breakdown would be on the head of the Israeli government if the negotiations broke down because the Arabs had a fundamentally dishonest premise that gets exposed because of the Israeli government taking the accords seriously. Outpost: Netanyahu's negotiating position seems right now to be set in negatives. No PLO state, no Jerusalem as the capital of a PLO state, no retreat from the Golan. Is there a problem with a negotiating posture that is set in negatives? Feith: Yes, there is a problem. It's part of the reason that democratic governments whose policies are essentially status quo and defensive, as opposed to revolutionary and aggressive, are often at an inherent disadvantage in peace or arms control negotiations with their adversaries. Their adversaries are constantly coming up with high sounding propositions, like "Abolish chemical weapons" or "Abolish nuclear testing", or "Land for peace" or whatever. It was easy for the Soviets during the Cold War to say, "Let us abolish a weapons system," which makes them sound very good from a public relations point of view, when they know darn well if we get an agreement on that subject, they can violate it. It's very easy for the Arabs to come forward and say "Land for peace," when they know that if they get an agreement and they get the land, they don't have to give the peace. It's always easier for dishonest, non-democratic regimes to come up with affirmative sounding proposals than for democratic governments that lack the ability to lie as easily. When democratic governments lie, the lies get exposed. They're accountable. So when the Soviets or the PLO throw around these high-sounding initiatives Israel winds up sounding very negative. "I'm against it. I'm against it. I'm against it." It's inherent in the way these things are set up. You have to be as clever as you can. That's part of the reason that you emphasize general propositions that sound positive that you can support, such as, "We're open to talk to anybody without pre-conditions." That gives you something positive to say. Outpost: But that only holds up until you start getting into negotiations. Feith: As long as there are general discussions, you are okay. As long as you can control the agenda, so that you are not pretending to be in favor of things you are not in favor of, you are okay. The danger comes when you start pretending to be in favor of things you are not in favor of. (Continued on p.12)

Outpost               - 10 -               July-August 1996