These successes paved the way for Operation Defensive Shield that began a week later in the wake of the terrorist attack on a Passover Seder at the Park Hotel in Netanya. However, the takeover of refugee camps and partial control of the Mukata compound in Ramallah (where Arafat was confined) were only the first barriers to be overcome. The next barrier was the notion of a separation between the political echelon -- those who produced the terror -- who were not to be hurt, in the interest of seeking negotiations at any price, and the operational echelon, who provided a very limited target. This barrier was finally crossed in June 2003, when a missile was fired unsuccessfully at Hamas spokesman Abd el-Aziz Rantisi. After a brief pause, Hamas returned to the attack after the military pressure against its leaders eased.

Under conditions of war it is necessary to act according to the principles of war.

At this point the connection between the threat to the head of the snake and its body became clear even to previous skeptics. This recognition led, in September 2003, to a temporary shaking off of the rules of attrition, with an unceasing series of additional air attacks on Hamas, including the bombing of a building in which the group's leadership were meeting, and bombings within Syria of a terrorist training base. The result was that the Hamas leadership went underground and their attacks ended. However, the pressure was again eased, and three months later, a Hamas spokesman told a mass open meeting in the presence of all its leaders -- clearly an ideal target -- that he intended to renew attacks of mass murder. Not surprisingly, the lack of continued pressure on the Hamas leadership resulted in the bombing of a Jerusalem bus in January 2004.

It seems that the passion of those who send terror bombers off to their deaths disappears when the subject becomes their own lives. The gains that resulted from the air attacks on the Hamas leadership proved, once again, that under conditions of war it is necessary to act according to the principles of war, including "concentration of effort" with "repetition and continuation," together with "actions aimed at a clear target."

The development of a new attitude by an organization that has chosen violence as its sole method of operation cannot come about through political negotiations with it, accompanied by "signals" that largely involve blowing up empty houses, imposing closures, and closing border crossings. All these actions are of little benefit because they present no threat to the center of gravity of the terror -- the leadership.

The halt in attacks by Hamas from September 2003 to January 2004 was the direct result of the threat to the lives of its leadership, together with the construction of a defensible physical barrier in the form of the security fence. This was in direct contradiction to the concept of attrition, which had guided the thought and actions of the heads of the security services and the IDF up to that point.

It seems that the passion of those who send terror bombers off to their deaths disappears when the subject becomes their own lives.

This situation is bitter proof once again of the validity of Israel's traditional security doctrine, that requires those in charge to apply force, i.e. the Israel Defense Forces, so as to provide defense and to achieve a decision as rapidly as possible against any type of war that may be waged against the State of Israel. True, the methods of action are different, and the restrictions, such as fighting in a civilian area full of media and everything that results from this, are more serious. But the necessity of having the IDF able to bring about a military decision in every type of war remains as valid as ever.  

Col. Wegman served for over a decade as a senior instructor of fighting doctrine at the IDF Command and General Staff College. This article is an edited version of Col. Wegman's paper, published in March 2004, in the Jerusalem Viewpoints series.

April 2004               - 7 -               Outpost