As opposed to the example of 1948, today the IDF is contributing to the entrenchment of the political approach. The establishment of a new fighting principle of "protracted attrition" is the antithesis of Israel's overall security doctrine, given that it is premised on the absence of any resolution of the war. It also ignores the fact that the Palestinian Arab strategy of terror is intended to bring about Israel's total defeat. Have the policymakers once again fallen prey to the hubris of underestimating the enemy, as occurred before the Yom Kippur War?

The idea of the impossibility of a rapid decision is based on the distinction between "war" and "limited conflict." In assuming the existence of such a distinction, it ignores the fact that as in any war, the prime motivation of terror is to reach a decision -- especially as implemented by the Palestinian Arab leadership. Believing that "the terror is not a threat to our existence" leads to "the terror is not bent on victory," which translates into "terror is not war." As a result, the attitude to terror differs from that adopted with respect to war, in which, according to Israel's traditional security doctrine, a rapid decision is required.

The desire for a decision is generally constrained by deterrence; in other words, the side intending to attack and force a decision does not actualize his intentions due to his recognition of the damage his side will incur should he attack. Suicide terrorists, though treated as if they were insurmountable weapons, are really products of a system whose leaders value their lives, property, and reputation. Accordingly, it is the heads of the terrorist organizations who should be the main targets of attack, and not simply the end products, the suicide bombers. Terror can be defeated by physically eliminating its ability to finance, enlist, organize, and transport terrorists. In other words, instead of operating according to the principle of "attrition," operations should be conducted in accordance with the old principles of initiative and aggressiveness, which will lead to full and ongoing control of the territory. Only the implementation of these principles will enable the identification and elimination of the organization and its leaders, producers of terror, including those masquerading as "statesmen."

All the evidence indicates that the doctrine of limi- ted conflict is convenient for the enemy, but not appropriate for the State of Israel. The concept of "protracted attrition" will enter the history books together with the disastrous conception of "stopping the enemy on the ceasefire lines" prior to 1973. The claim that "there is no solution to terror," which is the basis for the current, prolonged, decisionless attrition, endangers the continued existence of the State of Israel. The doctrine of limited conflict draws its principles from places in which the nation in control of distant foreign territory has the option of considering whether to retain its control, and when the damage liable to be caused as a result of its forfeiture of control is negligible. However, as opposed to other places and cases, the terror launched against the State of Israel must be treated like any other war, which requires a quick decision.

It is my belief that there is no problem that a particular group of people created, which cannot be solved by another group of people. The only difference is in the level of determination, cunning, and strength one is prepared to enlist. The Palestinian Arabs, Hezbollah, and others have learned that when the State of Israel decides to engage in a war of higher intensity, even without utilizing its total capacity, then terror -- wherever it reigns, however strong it is -- cannot stand up to the strength of the IDF. After more than three years of ineffectual combat following the doctrine of limited conflict, it has been proven that a "high intensity" response is the answer to terror.

The claim that "there is no solution to terror," which is the basis for the current, prolonged, decisionless attrition, endangers the continued existence of the State of Israel.

According to the principles outlined in Israel's "Battle Doctrine," the first rule of war is aggressiveness. The initiative must be taken away from the unorganized force, which must be forced to go on the defensive and must be relentlessly pursued. The fundamental principle in fighting against irregular forces is to strike at them and eliminate them before they go into action.

Unlike the senior IDF commanders, who at the instruction of the political echelon dealt primarily with "easing the conflict" and the search for a return to negotiations, it was the brigade commanders who proved that it was possible to achieve a military decision in those places that were wrongly thought to require a heavy price in blood. The conquest of the Balata refugee camp near Nablus by the Paratroop brigade in February 2002 and the capture of the Jenin refugee camp two days later by the Golani brigade, both with minimal losses, brought about the beginning of a change in the notion -- created by the idea of

Outpost               - 6 -               April 2004