In the last thirteen hundred years, only one Islamic country has become a democracy -- Turkey. But there has never been an Arab democracy. Some would say that Arab ideals and representative democracy are incompatible, that in Arabic Islam state authority and religious authority have always gone together. While the citizens of longstanding democracies accept a set of basic assumptions -- the rule of law, majority rule, equality before the law, the idea of a loyal opposition, the separation of church and state -- Arab societies lack such essential democratic concepts and instead vest authority in the word of Mohammed, his interpreters, the imams, and the tribal leaders.

The essence of Arab societies is tribal identity, kinship networks, and conceptions of collective honor. In such a context, democratic principles are incomprehensible. How could a modern, democratic bureaucracy function, for example, if officials remain loyal primarily to tribe or family? There can be no such thing as disinterested public service.

It is foolish to think that you can transform the values and mores of 1300 years of Arab culture in a few years of military occupation by imposing democracy from the top down.

A more realistic possibility for some degree of gradual change in Iraq in the direction of Western and democratic societies might be the creation of bottom-up institutions which give something valuable to the Iraqi people without taking too much of their old life away from them. The problem is that they don't know that they yearn for liberty and freedom and that what has kept them enslaved for so long are their own tribal ways to which they are so attached, and which they must, sooner or later, give up or change.

After a period of military stabilization, during which the Coalition forces can mop up the regular and irregular forces left over from the Saddam regime, get rid of the WMD, identify who the good guys and the bad guys are, provide humanitarian aid, and repair some of the infra-structural damage, the following plan will be ready for implementation.

It is a well known fact that after a war, the victors establish a more or less permanent presence in the conquered land. The U.S. Army and Air Force has had a garrison in Germany for almost fifty years, which until recently was welcomed by the Germans. We have a Marine/Naval base on a long-term lease in Guantanamo, Cuba, completely surrounded by our enemy. We have had a large Army base in South Korea, protecting the demilitarized zone and the people of Seoul, for forty years. These were and are important strategic points in our modern view of our place in the world.

What we should do is to remove our garrison from Germany, which no longer welcomes it. It was necessary during the cold war, but is not important strategically at present. And we should remove our air base from Saudi Arabia. It has recently become an embarrassment for both the Saudis and us. The removal will enable us to deal with the Saudis more realistically, putting political pressure on them when it is necessary.

Instead we must establish a naval base in the south of Iraq, on the Persian Gulf, an air base in the north of Iraq to replace the Saudi base, and in central Iraq a large Army base. These bases would be a strategic asset for the Central Command if ever a military force is needed in the Middle East or South Central Asia. Their presence would not only stabilize the overheated politics of the new Iraq, but the whole region as well.

In addition, our forces would be able to guarantee the safety of the Iraqi people and their oil fields from incursions of hostile neighbors or terrorists. In a sense, we would be a mercenary army and the Iraqi government would be our client. One major advantage to both the Iraqis and the U.S. would be that it would save the Iraqi government the great cost of raising its own army, and some of that saving might be used to defer the cost of running the U.S. garrison.

The semi-permanent emplacement of a U.S. military garrison in Iraq is the lynchpin of the plan. It supports and integrates the other components of the plan.

In the old days they used to say "winner take all," or "to the victors belong the spoils." In fact, even today it is still true in the Arab world. But in the high-minded world of the Anglosphere, where Western values are dominated by Judeo-Christian ideals and politesse we still must disguise the use of power in the assertion of national interests as acts motivated by altruism -- the 'liberation of Iraq.'

Let me see, how can I say this without seeming ...too...unilateral. Before the war we were accused by France of really being interested only in getting hold of Iraqi oil. It's not surprising that France -- the whited-sepulcher of all time -- should say this, since its oil companies have been in a conspiracy with Saddam to steal oil assets from the Iraqi people for the last twenty years.

So let's not be shy or shamed. We're going to be fair to the Iraqi people for a change, but we're going to charge them for reconstructing Iraq and for protecting them

Outpost               - 8 -               May 2003