The very term "Persian Gulf" is controversial. It is the name the Iranians, and the world in general, like to call it. The Arabs insist on calling it the Arab Gulf. The controversy over terminology is significant in itself.

The present war in Afghanistan derives from the Iranian Islamic revolution of February 1979. That led to the first Gulf war, which lasted from October 1980 to August 1988, longer than World War II, and resulted in about 1,000,000 casualties on both sides. The second Gulf War came a decade later. What is happening today is a direct result of those two wars, because there are things that were begun but never completed, and the ricochets from those two wars are precisely what is at stake today.

We begin with two countries that are quite powerful, the two powers of the Gulf. Iran and Iraq are not only wealthy because of their oil (Iraq also in terms of water), but they are powerful militarily and so no other Arab country is likely to have designs on them. But there is a third power, Saudi Arabia, which unlike these two has great wealth but is very, very weak militarily. Saudi Arabia therefore creates a kind of imbalance, constituting a juicy pear that other Arab countries would like to sink their teeth into -- and many attempts have been made to do just that.

Iraq and Iran are vastly different. Iraq is a large country; in terms of territory it is bigger than united Germany and comes very close to Spain and France, the largest territories in Europe. But Iran is a really huge country, three times the size of Iraq, with three times its population. Iraq has about 20 million people, Iran about 65 million. In other words, the staying power of Iran is much greater, and this was a determining factor in the outcome of the first Gulf War.

The revolution in Iran started in February 1979, and Saddam Hussein, who was already in charge in Iraq, feared that the Iranian revolution, with its zeal and enthusiasm, might spill over his border. Not only is Iraq's entire southern region populated by Shi'ites, but Shi'ites constitute the demographic majority in Iraq, about 55% of the population. The threat, from Saddam Hussein's point of view, was genuine. And therefore, in October 1980, Saddam decided to invade the Gulf area of Iran so as to pre-empt the revolution from entering his territory. He probably reasoned that if he could show his Shi'ites that the Iranian revolution was a paper tiger, his people, many of whom were restless, would be satisfied that they could do nothing against the very strong central regime of Saddam Hussein.

And so he did. He invaded the territory of the Gulf. The American hostages were still being held; the Iranian regime was regarded as highly aggressive; it was pretty much isolated internationally; and Saddam believed that nobody would shed a tear if Iran was taught a lesson. He also thought that the war would be a 2-3 week picnic during which he would occupy territory on the Gulf, which, by the way, is inhabited by Arabs. We are talking about a part of Iran, populated by Arab tribes who speak Arabic, which also happens to be one of the richest in oil. Saddam reasoned that not only would he join to Iraq an Arab population which he thought would be receptive to him as the leader of a major Arab country, but he would also bring under his control an additional 10-15% of the world's oil reserves. Add this to the 10-15% Iraq already possessed and the aggregate would be some 30% of the world production of oil. And Saddam thought that if he accomplished this, the world would be at his feet, because he would equal Saudi Arabia in terms of wealth. So, it was a very tempting calculation.

Saddam's problem was that he had an exit, or an access, to the sea only some 35 kilometers wide.

But Saddam's calculations went further. Iraq could put together an army of one million men. No country in Europe has an army even close to that size. In addition to oil Iraq also has a lot of water, which in some areas of the Middle East can be more precious than oil. The Tigris and Euphrates join together about 50 miles north of the delta to form the 2-3 kilometers wide Shatt al-Arab. It is a huge river that forms the border between Iraq and Iran. Putting all these together, Saddam thought that he could become a major power. But think about this. You have a major land force, armor, thousands of tanks, and so on. But in order to maintain your hegemony in the Gulf that is not enough, because you must maintain a strong navy in order to patrol this vitally important Gulf area. Saddam's problem was that he had an exit, or an access, to the sea only some 35 kilometers wide. In other words, the only military navy he could put in the area to police it was exposed on both sides of the Gulf: Saddam badly needed a shoreline on the Gulf. This was one of the major strategic issues that was involved in his decision to invade where he did, the need to enlarge the shoreline.

As is well known, the three week picnic became a trench war, like World War I, because the Iranians had

March 2002               - 3 -               Outpost