(born and raised in Egypt) and those he purports to represent, is now, as it was in 1967, or 1948, "ethnic Arab." The word "Palestinian" is a geographic adjective, like "Libyan" or "Syrian." It does not constitute an ethnic identity . The ease with which this historical fiction has been accepted may simply be a tribute to the astonishing Israeli ineptitude in presenting its case. But sensible people realize that western Palestine contains two peoples, the Jews and the Arabs. If some of those Arabs have renamed themselves it does not mean others must be obligingly credulous and participate in the masquerade. And if a second Arab-ruled state were ever to be built west of the Jordan River, and to appropriate for itself the term created by the Romans to efface the Jewish connection to the land, "Palestine," this still would not create a "Palestinian people."

Indeed, the fiction need not be maintained indefinitely, and were Israel to cease to exist, the "Palestinian people" would similarly cease to exist, and be folded back into the larger Arab collective, al-umma al-arabiyya. Indeed, if Israel were to be pushed back to the 1949 ceasefire lines (living in constant anxiety, and with a hair-trigger defense), that itself might be enough to cause the "Palestinian people" to be jettisoned as an anomaly. Whether pan-Arab or pan-Islamic in aspirations, Arabs will understand that this particular political fiction, having served its intended purpose, is no longer needed. There exists today a country called the United Arab Emirates, but no one believes, least of all the Arabs, that there exists a separate "United Arab Emiratian people."

The historic parallel between the Palestinian Arabs and the Sudeten Germans is extraordinary. Perhaps that is why Milos Zeman, the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, has been so forthright in his comparison: in the Czech Parliament, on April 25, 2002, and not for the first time, he declared that the situation of Israel today was like that of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Then, Czechoslovakia was the most liberal, tolerant, advanced state in all of Central Europe. Its leaders, Benes and Masaryk, were among the most enlightened of statesmen. Yet, in the area that ran around the borders of Czechoslovakia, there was a population of ethnic Germans. They spoke German. They had German churches. They had German schools. They relished their German identity, and looked forward to incorporation into the Third Reich. There were three million of them. Henlein, their leader, was encouraged by Hitler to emphasize the demand of "self-determination" for the "Sudeteners."

The British sent the smiling Sir Basil Runciman to Prague, where he sought, in words which have a familiar ring (he repeated the phrase often) a "comprehensive and lasting settlement" by forcing the Czechs to surrender all the territories in which the Sudeten Germans lived. There were riots, instigated by Henlein and, from a distance, by Hitler. The Czechs put down the riots, and the French and British media of the period then howled with indignation -- because, after all, they had already decided that Czechoslovakia, or bits and pieces of it, was expendable. Benes and Masaryk, those enlightened, tolerant, peaceful statesmen of an enlightened, tolerant, and peaceful country, argued that they had to hold on to the Sudetenland. Their protests failed; they could not, of course, prove a future disaster. The results we know.

And after World War II, with not a syllable of protest from anyone, the Czech government understandably, and justifiably, expelled all three million ethnic Germans from the Sudetenland -- including, no doubt, some who were entirely innocent, a German community that had lived there for some six hundred years. Irredentist claims by those Germans received little sympathy.

The government of Iran recently said it would be happy to see ten percent of the world's Muslims sacrificed if, in recompense, all Israelis were wiped out.

Unlike the Czechs, who in 1938 could offer no firm evidence of Hitler's intentions (except his words, written and spoken), the Israelis have deeds as well as Arab words, written and spoken. For they can point to the pre-1967 situation, which tellingly shows that before a single Israeli was in the West Bank or Gaza, the Arabs were bent on destroying the Jewish state. There is no evidence to suggest that that goal has changed, and a mountain of evidence to suggest otherwise, including Arab manuals which discuss at length the "two-stage" strategy of annihilation. Indeed, the recent flood of hysteria and hate (Al-Jazeera, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the Pearl murder on videotape used by Arab terrorists as a recruiting tool) -- suggests that Arab intentions are more nakedly genocidal than ever before.

The Arabs have managed to enroll other Muslims in their fight, and to implicate them in future mass murder. The government of Iran recently said it would be happy to see ten percent of the world's Muslims sacrificed if, in recompense, all Israelis were wiped out. There is no reason to think that such views are not widespread, just as Bin Laden, despite propagandists in the United States who claim otherwise, remains a wildly popular figure all over the Arab and Muslim world.

Ethnic Germans before World War II had no real interest in independence for the "Sudeteners," but did have a great interest in depriving Czechoslovakia of the Sudetenland, the strip along the border that bristled with Czech fortifications, and was essential to its defense. Similarly, ethnic Arabs today, in their 22 states, are indifferent to the day-to-day welfare of the local Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza, but find them useful as shock troops and cannon fodder -- and the more wretched their lives, the more hysterical and violent their world-view, the better -- goes the (mis) calculation, for the Arab cause, and for relieving pressure on Arabian despots.

June 2002               - 7 -               Outpost