The defeat suffered by the Arabs in the Six-Day War of June 1967 changed that. It was recognized that there had to be re-packaging of the conflict to make it more attractive to the outside world. The constant threats to "exterminate the Jews" that were made on behalf of the Arabs by, among others, Azzam Pasha (Secretary of the Arab League in 1948) , Gamal Abdel Nasser (who ruled Egypt during the Sinai Campaign and the Six-Day War), and Ahmed Shukhairy (Arafat's predecessor), would no longer do. Thus were the "Palestininian people" born, although the exact date of birth was not precisely in 1967 but a few years later.

By the early 1970s the conflict had been successfully redefined for much of the world. No longer was it seen as the attempt of an army of Muslim Arabs to wipe out the tiny Jewish (infidel) state from the midst of one uninterrupted Arab Muslim domain from Morocco to the Gulf. Instead, it was now the conflict "between two tiny peoples," each "struggling for its homeland." This "two-tiny-peoples" theme, that could be believed only by those oblivious to the Muslim doctrine that divides the world uncompromisingly between the Dar al-Islam (Domain of Islam) and the Dar al-Harb (Domain of the Infidel), was in fact widely accepted. It got a boost particularly from Israelis eager to believe that this conflict was a "problem" susceptible to solution, amenable to a compromise, that would consist in Israel relinquishing territory it had won in its wars of defense. The alternative, that Arab hostility could be held in check only by deterrence, with no end in sight, was too painful to contemplate.

"It is only for political reasons that we carefully underline our Palestinian identity, because it is in the interest of the Arabs to encourage a separate Palestinian identity in contrast to Zionism."

And, of course, it has been convenient for those outside Israel who do not wish it well to promote the idea of a "Palestinian people" and to assert that a "Palestinian (Arab) state" in Western Palestine (requiring a return more or less to the 1949 ceasefire lines) would satisfy the Arab appetite.

Willful neglect of repeatedly stated Arab ambitions and, even more important, of basic tenets of Islam, are required for such a belief to be entertained. Some Arabs occasionally reveal the truth even to Westerners. Zuheir Mohsen, for example, the head of the As Saiqa terrorist group, and the head of military operations for the PLO, as well as a member of its Supreme Council, gave an interview to the Dutch daily Trouw (March 31, 1977). He noted:

"There are no differences between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. We are all part of one nation. It is only for political reasons that we carefully underline our Palestinian identity, because it is in the interest of the Arabs to encourage a separate Palestinian identity in contrast to Zionism. Yes, the existence of a separate Palestinian identity is there only for tactical reasons. The establshment of a Palestinian state is a new expedient to continue the fight against Zionism and for Arab unity."

There is nothing novel about this statement. It expresses what had been well understood among Arabs (although inserting "Muslim" after "Lebanese" would be an appropriate emendation). The only unusual aspect is that it was said to a non-Arab journalist. There are, of course, differences of dialect and of political regime that distinguish an Arab in Damascus from one in Amman or Baghdad (Arafat's Arabic retains traces of his Egyptian origins), but they are hardly differences of "peoplehood." They are, in fact, exactly like the differences between West Germans and East Germans, or North Koreans and South Koreans, or North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese. Indeed, between an Arab in Ramallah or Jericho, and one living a few miles away, across the river in Jordan, under a Hashemite king, the differences are far less.

The nation-state is a European construct. Arab loyalties are primarily of two kinds, one smaller and one greater than that construct. Local loyalties are to family and to tribe; on a larger scale, loyalty is reserved either for pan-Arabism, or pan-Islamism. For the Arabs, who see themselves as one people, and take pride in that unity (despite differences among the rulers), and who share the same language, the same religion (almost all are Muslim), the same political and literary culture, the same media, the same historical memory, the same historical resentments and hostilities, the same dreams and plans, the idea of the nation-state means less than it does anywhere else in the world. Nonetheless, accidents of history have permitted the Arab people to be the most richly endowed with nation-states of any people on earth.

Whether supporters of the pan-Arab nationalism promoted by Nasser, or followers of pan-Islamism, exemplified by Bin Laden, the nation-state truly matters, among the Arabs, only to their rulers, the warlords, despots, the place-men and propagandists, for without the existence of such separate states, those ruling elites would be deprived of the sources of their power and wealth. In their world, not economic activity, but political power, or access to it, is the only means to economic advancement. Arafat in 1974 said that "Palestine does not interest us. It is a drop in the vast Arab ocean from Morocco to the Gulf." In one sense, that is true; in another, he is deeply interested in "Palestine" because he wants a state, in order to be that state's warlord.

Despite the indifference of Arabs themselves to the significance of the nation-state, the 22 they do possess constitute the Arab League. There is the Arab Re-

Outpost               - 4 -               June 2002