[(Continued from p.3)]
of the "revolutionary" ideological platform of the Fatah movement, headed by Arafat, which has not been revised since the last general council meeting in 1989. Sakher Habash, a member of the central committee of Fatah, one of its founders and its recognized chief of ideology, referred to the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian "cultural confrontation" in a speech made in Arafat's name on January 30, 2001:"Experience teaches us that without establishing a Palestinian state on the entire land, peace cannot be achieved. We are undergoing a struggle through which we can compel the Zionist society to get rid of Zionism, because there can be no coexistence between Zionism and the Palestinian national movement."
Regarding the settlement of the Palestinian problem, the PA, Fatah, and the PLO clearly distinguish between a "political solution" and a "historic solution." This distinction draws its inspiration and legitimacy from the decisions of the 12th meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) of 1974, collectively known as the "Doctrine of Stages." At the time, that doctrine expressed a fundamental change in the strategy of the PLO, from a rigid doctrine of uncompromising armed struggle for the liberation of the whole of Palestine, to the acceptance of a gradual liberation process as allowed by the prevailing political and military conditions. Following are some of the decisions of the 12th meeting of the PNC, which paved the way for Arafat's speech to the UN General Assembly and launched the PLO's political engagement:
We are undergoing a struggle through which we can compel the Zionist society to get rid of Zionism, because there can be no coexistence between Zionism and the Palestinian national movement.
Item 2: The PLO will struggle by all means, first and foremost by the armed struggle, to liberate the land of Palestine and to establish the independent rule of the fighting nation on every part of Palestine which will be liberated...this will bring a great change in the balance of power in favor of our nation and its struggle.
Item 3: The PLO will struggle against the establishment of any Palestinian entity (that will) concede Palestinian national rights for a return and self-determination on its national territory.
Item 4: Each step that leads to liberation must be taken in the framework of the PLO's (grand) strategy for establishing the democratic Palestinian state, as defined by previous PNC decisions.
Item 10: The leadership of the revolution will define the tactics for achieving our goals within the framework of this plan (i.e., this strategy).
The political solution is thus a tactic that serves a strategy. It stems from recognition of the temporary weakness of the Palestinian side, and is aimed at achiev-ing a gradual improvement in its relative position through political arrangements that will ultimately lead to the historic (and, in the Palestinian view, inevitable) shift of the balance of power in favor of the Palestinians.
There is a broad consensus on the Palestinian side that no Palestinian is authorized to concede one single iota of the basic principles governing the solution of the Palestinian problem. The draft Palestinian constitution, submitted for Arafat's approval in mid-2000, states that "Palestine is the heritage of the Palestinian nation throughout the generations, and its national rights in Palestine are the joint legacy of all Palestinians. It is their duty to safeguard them and to pass them on from one generation to the next." This means that "the gates of confrontation" remain open to the Palestinians, until such time as the "historic solution" is realized.
In Palestinian thought, the "historic solution" will be manifested by the achievement of "justice" for the Palestinians, namely, the correction of the "historic wrong" inflicted upon the Palestinian people by the eruption of Zionism in Palestine. The often-repeated term in Arafat's speeches (used even during the height of the political negotiations) -- "a just and lasting peace" -- is a coded reference to his strategic view.
The Interim Agreements within the framework of the Oslo "Declaration of Principles" are perceived by the Palestinians as part of the "political solution," that is, essentially a tactical move. In his 1994 book The Historic Danger and the Borders of National Completeness, Sakher Habash explains that the Palestinians' agreement to Oslo was made in the context of a long-term, visionary strategy. In Habash's analysis:
1. The source of legitimacy for the Oslo process was, and still is, the decisions of the 12th meeting of the PNC (i.e., the "Doctrine of Stages").
2. The departure point for the Palestinian embarkation on a political track is the general political situation and the trend of decline in the Zionist enterprise, which is expressed in the Israeli readiness to give up the dream of the "entire Land of Israel" and to evacuate the territories occupied in 1967.
3. The Oslo process did not modify the Palestinians' vision or strategy. A just and permanent solution to the Palestinian problem can be achieved only by the realization of the right of return of the 1948 refugees and their descendants, and by establishing the democratic Palestinian state over the entire land of Palestine.
4. National goals are to be implemented in stages: First, an interim arrangement, through which the PA will establish its rule over the West Bank and Gaza. Only later will the "Final Solution" (sic) be achievedthe uprooting of the occupation, national independence side by side with the armed struggle and the intifada, in order to move into "the future struggle that will make the demo-
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Outpost - 4 - December 2002