On March 13, the U.S.-sponsored Resolution 1397, endorsing the principle of Palestinian statehood, passed 14-0 in the United Nations Security Council. While presumably viewed by the administration as a carrot to induce Arab "allies" to support a forthcoming war against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the action is a watershed marking the end of the President's war on terror.

On September 20, 2001, President Bush had laid down the line unequivocally: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." But while there can be little doubt the President's instincts are sound, the UN resolution delivered the opposite message. If the terror is directed against another party and if it appears to us that we have the option of deflecting it from the U.S. by acknowledging the validity of its motivations, we may support a given group of terrorists. The very next day President Bush underlined the new message, declaring at a press conference: "Frankly, it's not helpful what the Israelis have recently done in order to create conditions for peace." He shifted the onus for bloodshed to Prime Minister Sharon: "I certainly hope that Prime Minister Sharon is concerned about the loss of innocent [Palestinian] life. We certainly -- I certainly am." And that same day General Zinni was once again dispatched to Israel to pressure its weak government to embark on more unilateral concessions and retreats.

From the outset of its own war against al-Qaeda, the U.S. had struggled with the dilemma of how to respond to Arafat's campaign of terror. Prior to September 11, the administration had regularly excoriated Israel for its "unhelpful" attempts to defend itself against the wave of murderous attacks from the Palestinian Authority, which, so the litany went, only reenforced "the cycle of violence." This policy continued post September 11, but once the U.S. mounted its all-out effort to destroy al-Qaeda and the Taliban, President Bush, to his credit, changed course. He forthrightly identified Arafat and the PA as the source of terror and demanded that they put a halt to it. Equally important, he recognized Israel's right to take action in defense of her citizens.

In changing course once again to reward Palestinian terror at the UN, the administration, not surprisingly, has merely whetted Arab appetites. On his tour of Arab capitals, Vice President Richard Cheney encountered a solid wall of resistance to military action against Iraq. He found to his dismay that Arab leaders wanted to talk only of Israel. Judging from press reports in the region, Arab leaders talked blackmail. The Saudi daily al-Watan warned that "America could lose its interests in the Gulf if it continues not to take into consideration the interests of the region, that is to say to force Israel to abide by the peace process." On March 17, Cheney and United Arab Emirate President Sheikh al-Nahayan agreed that the Saudi plan "had provided a path" to peace. (This so-called Saudi peace plan, which President Bush has also praised, is nothing but the Arafat plan, calling for Israel to return to the 1949 borders and provide a "just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees in conformity with Resolution 194," i.e. the "right to return.")

To avoid acknowledging the trip's failure, Cheney was reduced to declaring that "some people want to believe there's only one issue I'm concerned about," but Iraq was "one of many issues we're concerned about." He also said the U.S. had no plans to attack Iraq in the near future. But while it is understandable that the administration should want to put the best face possible upon a disappointing outcome, it converted the trip into a real defeat by shifting to the Arab priority--pressure on Israel. The U.S. resuscitated Arafat (insisting Israel allow him to move freely), strong-armed Israel to give up its policy of occupying terror strongholds, and sent General Anthony Zinni to revive the Tenet and Mitchell Plans, both of which are severely inimical to Israeli interests.

The U.S. seems to be operating on the assumption that Israel's defeat by terror will allow its own war on terror to succeed.

Baldly put, the U.S. seems to be operating on the assumption that Israel's defeat by terror will allow its own war on terror to succeed. The Arab states whisper in the ear of U.S. diplomats -- who are oh, so eager to believe -- that it is Israel's existence that underlies Islamic hostility to the West, above all the United States. But this is a siren song, as surely as the one that lured Odysseus -- and to which he wisely closed his ears.

When Islamic fundamentalists refer to the U.S. as the big Satan and Israel as the little Satan, they are affirming their belief that both are utterly evil with the U.S. as the larger, more powerful Satan, even more dangerous. The virulent hatred disseminated throughout the Arab world toward Israel and Jews may obscure this reality. Bernard Lewis, the doyen of Western scholars of Islam, has pointed out that Jews are demonized in the literature of the Arab world to an extent that goes beyond anything ever seen in the West with the exception of Nazi Germany. The long-ago exposed forgery, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, remains a best seller in the Arab world. Cartoons, editorials, newspaper articles, sermons by religious leaders, all treat Jews as anti-human creatures for whom there can be no sympathy or

April 2002               - 3 -               Outpost