5. A public desperate for action, any action, turns to off-the-wall ideas like "A Wall." According to this absurd notion, now sweeping Left and Right, the government is supposed to define Israel's borders (in some scenarios immediately, in some after a short, sharp war against the Palestinian Authority) and build a huge wall around the state. In the United States, "A Wall" has been espoused by both Charles Krauthammer and George Will, normally paragons of clear thinking.

What is wrong with "A Wall"? Symbolically, a Wall is disastrous, for it signifies to the Arab world that an enfeebled and terrified Israel has returned to a kind of medieval ghetto. Where will the wall (an enormously expensive undertaking that would take years to complete) be constructed? Given the way so many Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria are intertwined with areas of Arab settlement, presumably most would simply be abandoned as "unconducive-to-A-Wall." Is this Wall to circle Israel within the old Green Line? What about Jerusalem? Given the Arab population in East Jerusalem, is the Wall to go through the city, redividing it? Not only would all this be viewed (and be) a huge victory for Arab terror, but it would be tremendously divisive for Israel.

Moreover, as Professor Steven Plaut points out, no wall will prevent incursions by terrorists, who will "dig under, run around, sail around, and shoot over even the strongest wall," while the areas beyond the Wall will be "the familiar PLO Nazi-style training gounds and launching points." And what about Israel's large Arab citizenry within the Wall (even were it to follow the 1949 borders), much of it already an active fifth column? As Plaut points out, "two of them nearly shut down half of Israel while trying to bomb a Haifa nightclub."

Michael Ledeen reminds us of George Patton's observation that defensive fortifications are a monument to human stupidity, as centuries of shattered barricades, trenches, moats and walls testify. Israel's last experiment with "A Wall," the Bar Lev Line along the Suez Canal, proved a disaster during the 1973 war. And what, pray tell, do the proponents of the Wall think the Arabs will be doing on their side of it as Israel cowers behind the Wall's supposed protection? It does not take a strategic genius to figure out that they will be massively building up their arsenal. Iraq, Iran, Syria and yes, Egypt, will flood it with sophisticated armaments and "volunteers" from as far afield as Afghanistan and Pakistan will pour in to help prepare for the "final solution." Even now, behind the electronic fence Israel has constructed along the Lebanese border, Hezbollah, contemptuous of an Israeli army that scurried from Lebanon as a result of its guerilla strikes, is installing Iranian Fajr-5 missiles capable of reaching the suburbs of Haifa.

6. The effect of the policy of "restraint" upon the world's movers and shakers (media, national elites, government leaders) is the opposite of what the Israeli government naively believed it would be. The government was convinced that the policy would gain Israel widespread sympathy, restoring to it the image of the underdog, and making it clear to the world that it was Arafat and the Palestinians that were the aggressors. On the contrary, much of the mainstream media has grown steadily more unfriendly to Israel (while the BBC's naked hostility is unmatched, CNN and the New York Times are not far behind). Nor should this be surprising. While underdogs tend to arouse media sympathy, these are underdogs whose power is far inferior to that of the opponent. Israel possesses superior power which it fails to use effectively. There has been little sympathy for Goliath in his battle with David, although Goliath was the victim. By failing to exert its power, by professing itself even now eager to make further concessions to Arafat, Israel seems to be recognizing the validity of Palestinian grievances.

By its very agreement to the Mitchell Plan, Israel implicitly endorses the bizarre notion that the PA's war on Israel is merely a bump on the road to peace.

And so, rather than building up support, Israel finds itself trapped in a moral equivalency game. In this game, as Institute for Strategic Policy and Analysis director Robert Lowenberg points out, the Arabs are actually superior, because more of them have died. Western governments, including the United States, have condemned even pin-point responses by Israel against terrorists as "extra-judicial assassinations." The more Israel passively endures attacks on its sovereignty and the security of its citizens, the more it is expected to endure. Thus, for example, the U.S. responded to Israel's seizure of Orient House by objecting that Israel had been turning a blind eye to its illegal activities all these years--why act now? The West's solution for Israel under fire? Back to the Gulf War. Perfect restraint. Nor, given Israel's continued pretense that there are negotiations to be salvaged, is the United States attitude likely to undergo radical change even as the U.S. gears up for its own fight against terror.

7. Immobility is simply not a tenable response to

September-October 2001               - 5 -               Outpost