The above notwithstanding, it is unreasonable to assume that Arab countries are not noticing the deterioration of Israel's national strength. It is hard to exclude the possibility that in a situation of this sort, an overwhelming temptation to deliver a knockout blow when the appropriate opportunity arises will not manifest itself.

Unless Israel rehabilitates its deterrence capability, the situation will just get worse.

Since the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the possibility has loomed that the Arabs would initiate a "limited war" which is broad in scope though limited in its territorial goals and whose aim is to put into motion a political process which would induce Israel to withdraw. In my opinion the likelihood is not that great, since whoever initiates the war cannot be certain how and where it will end. Nevertheless, with the deterioration of Israeli deterrence, it seems that the danger of a war of this sort has increased, with the Syrian and Lebanese arena being the most likely. It should be noted that even if the Israeli nuclear deterrent plays a role in the context of an all-out war, it has little if any significance in the context of a limited war.

If Israeli deterrent capability has not been totally lost in the case of an all-out or limited war, it has completely collapsed in the case of a low-intensity conflict. Unless Israel rehabilitates its deterrence capability, the situation will just get worse.

The Problem of Image

Israel's image as an infirm limb and a punching bag against whom even those much weaker dare to take action is a highly unhealthy situation for a country in Israel's milieu. Public morale in a threatened country has supreme importance and when Israel's citizens are reminded of the deterioration of their country's deterrence on a daily basis they become deeply despondent. This has already resulted in disdain for government institutions and those heading them, which could snowball into civil disobedience, possible violence, emigration and the like. A country whose citizens cannot be proud of it or its power does not have a bright future.

Abroad the impact is also serious. Israel, which once served as a role model in combating terrorism and violence, is now perceived as a weakling incapable of overcoming almost any violence against it. While the world generally supports the Palestinians, no tears would be shed if we overcame those who threaten us by decisive, quick and elegant actions. This is also true of the United States. There too, we are losing our image as an ally of which one could be proud. Politically, Israel seems to be a burden on American foreign policy and economically, a burden even on Congress, which was always the friendliest institution to Israel (not to mention on the American taxpayer).

If Israel's deterrent capability remains at its present level, there is a danger a breach will form in its new strategic treaty and cooperation with Turkey. If Israel does not actualize its threats against Syria, which supports the Hizbullah, it is doubtful that Turkey will view Israel as a reliable ally against their common enemy.

Another danger in the deterioration of Israeli deterrence is that it adversely impacts Israeli Arabs. The Israeli Arab riots of recent years are only minimally related to their "discriminated-against" status and more to their identification with their Palestinian brethren in Judea, Samaria and Gaza and to their deep-rooted hatred of the Jewish state. Since Labor in Israel is extremely dependent politically on the votes of the Arab minority, that minority has leverage both on that party and on Labor governments. In any case, the situation in which a large segment of Israeli Arabs allow themselves time and again to stage violent riots for which they are unrestrained and are not appropriately punished, can lead to anarchy and the disintegration of Israel from within.

Without Deterrence, There is No Resolution to Conflict with the Arabs

Another significance of the decline of Israel's deterrence is that it eliminates any possibility of resolving the conflict with the Arabs. It should be stated at the outset that any advantageous resolution of the conflict from Israel's perspective is practically impossible. There can be no real peace in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the world has recently learned that sworn enemies can find a path to reasonable coexistence without peacee.g. the warming of relations between the two Koreas, the end of the war between Iran and Iraq and others. If there is any chance for the thawing of the conflict in our region, it is certainly if and when Israel displays its might and is perceived as the strongest regional power. If Israeli deterrence is waning or at an all-time low, there is no chance in the world that the Arabs and the Palestinians will come to terms with Israel's existence in any form.

Israel has an overriding need to rehabilitate its deterrence capability. In order to accomplish this, first and foremost, the Israeli leadership and public must be aware of the need. Only then is there a chance that they will be resolute in taking the necessary steps despite the possible high cost involved.

Concessions and withdrawals are the antithesis of rehabilitation of the deterrence capability. Ceding territory to the Palestinians not only weakens Israel but restricts the ability of the IDF to function against terrorists

[(Continued on p.7)]

Outpost               - 6 -               May 2001