[(Continued from p.4)]
planes, tanks, missile boats which violated our sovereignty, but that time has passed and is gone forever."Turning to his huge audience he added: "Today, you are safe and happy in Bint-Jebail, while they, in their settlements along the entire northern border of Palestine, tremble in fear before an unknown future." He called on the Palestinians to emulate their struggle: "In order to liberate your land, you have no need for tanks and planes. If you model yourselves after our holy martyrs, you can force your demands on the Zionist aggressors."
The gravity of his statements is twofold: First, he correctly sees the depths to which the power of Israel has descended. Second, what he says reveals that this is the way we are perceived by him and almost certainly many Arabs. In this regard, it is worth noting the statement of Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk a-Shara on Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon--"it indicates the correct way to battle against Israel." It is also appropriate to recall that Sheik Ahmed Yassin preceded Nasrallah in diagnosing Israel's weakness. When he was still incarcerated in an Israeli jail he told interviewers that "the Jews have lost their will to fight and as a result, Arab victory is near."
It is difficult to ignore the direct connection between the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon and the outbreak of the Palestinian mini-war against Israel in late September 2000. Incidentally, this was the case when the first intifada erupted in 1987 in the wake of the initial, partial IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985.
Deterrence capability is also based on credibility (that it will be implemented) and determination (that it will be implemented appropriately). However, the Arabs have encountered the emptiness of our leaders' threats time and again. This was the case in the Gulf War of 1991, when we threatened Saddam that he ought not dare to launch ground-to-ground missiles against us "because his fate will be bitter and awful," and the war ended without our actualizing this threat at all. This was the case in many incidents in our struggle against the Hizbullah when we did not act upon our threats to severely damage Syrian interests there. So, too, we are not carrying out our warnings to the Palestinian Authority in the mini-war since October 2000. If any warnings are actualized, it is done in sterile measures and "signals" which have been repeated to the point of absurdity.
On a more fundamental plane, the Arabs and Palestinians are aware of the basic difficulties of a democratic-pluralistic country in its struggle against terrorism and "low intensity conflicts" in general, and those of the State of Israel in particular. Israel, which once displayed resolve in confronting terrorism almost never does so anymore. The Arabs know that it is not impossible to deal with terrorism and guerrilla warfare and examples are not lacking. The English liquidated the Arab rebellion (1936-39), the Greek underground in Cyprus (1959) and the rebellion in Malaysia (in the 1960s). The German, Italians and Japanese subdued the "red armies" which functioned in their countries; Turkey, for the most part, subdued the Kurdish rebellion. And there are, of course, many other examples. But the Arabs and Palestinians are counting on the fact that Israeli society will oppose implementing a severe (and proper) policy against terrorist acts and the authorities that support them, especially in this era of "the peace process."
The Arab viewpoint regarding a comprehensive, all-out conventional war is quite different. Central regional countries like Egypt and Jordan are not at all enthusiastic about being dragged into a war with Israel. Nevertheless, Arab countries are also aware that, unlike Israel, whose ability to absorb a beating is deficient, they can withstand powerful and painful military strikes. It is important to understand that the ability to absorb a beating is a crucial matter in the balance of deterrence. The might of the deterring power can cause significant losses and pain, but if the deterred rival has the ability to absorb those losses it can significantly neutralize the might of the deterring power.
As a result of their economic resources and geo-strategic advantages, the Arabs can also assume that the world will not allow them to be totally defeated in war or any other broad conflict. This was the case in the 1973 war, when Kissinger prevented Israel from liquidating the surrounded Egyptian third army. This was the case when the superpowers--especially the U.S.--did not allow the PLO or the Syrians to be completely defeated in the Peace of Galilee Operation in 1982. And today as well, the United States is making sure that we do not utilize "exaggerated force" in response to the outrageous Palestinian violence and aggression, so that we should not, heaven forbid, force them to request a cease-fire.
It goes without saying that nothing good for Israel can emerge from the decline of Israeli deterrence. The first consequence is the danger of war. For a long time, I have been of the opinion that the dangers of a comprehensive war between the Arab countries and Israel are not high, first and foremost because the balance of power is not in the Arabs' favor. Syria, despite its large army, does not appear to be militarily strong, with its air force especially vulnerable. Egypt, despite its military buildup, knows it can gain nothing and can only lose through war. Iraq, the third largest Arab country, does not present a significant threat to Israel in the foreseeable future.
Regarding the balance of power, three large
Arab countries are, therefore, not in a good position to
launch a war against Israel. Moreover, it seems that the
current Arab strategy rests on the belief that they will be able
to overcome Israel by means of a political struggle or pres-
[(Continued on p.6)]
May 2001 - 5 - Outpost