[(Continued from p.3)]
We cannot avoid discussing the erosion in the United States' support for Israel over the last decade. True, Israel's value as a "strategic asset" has decreased since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But the central cause, in our opinion, for the decrease in American backing is because Israel attempted to involve the United States as an "honest broker" in the conflict. Since the Israeli leaders believed in the delusions of peace, they were, perhaps, unaware of the high price they would be forced to pay for America's involvement in the resolution of the conflict. As an "honest broker," the United States was obligated to equally divide (the best case scenario for Israel) its beneficence between the two opponents. The side that suffered from this was automatically Israel, while the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular were the beneficiaries. Hence Israel was badly weakened even in the ally parameter of staying power.
Against "low intensity conflicts," the conventional military might of the IDF has little pertinence.
The above clearly attests to Israel's lowered standing against its enemies. But its leaders and the defense establishment affiliated with the Israeli Left unceasingly prattle that "Israel is strong and has the strongest army in the Middle East" (this, primarily to convince the nation to continue the withdrawals and surrenders of territories in our homeland). It is true that the IDF has intrinsic strengths but this is only in the realm of conventional, regular war. Against "low intensity conflicts" (like in Lebanon, Judea, Samaria and Gaza), the conventional military might of the IDF has little pertinence.
Once again, military strength on its own is insufficient for a state in existential danger. Without the intangible parameters of "staying power" there is no strength and no power. And since Israel's staying power is flawed, it is impossible to speak about a powerful Israel or IDF at all. Statements of that sort are dangerous, idle boasting.
In the past, no Israeli leader would have dreamed of entrusting the responsibility for its security to others, and certainly not to Arabs. However, with Israeli leadership and society having lost the will to fight, it reached the point where our leaders placed their trust in Palestinians, the United Nations, etc.
One of the causes of the inconsistency in Rabin's statement just before Oslo that "he would not speak to the PLO and that there is no room for an additional country between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan" and his signing the Oslo agreement was his fatigue and lack of resolve in combating terrorism and the intifada. This manifested itself in his unfortunate statement "Let us allow the PLO to fight terrorism, they'll do it better than us without the High Court of Justice and B'tselem (an Israeli human rights organization)." The assumption was the Palestinian sub-contractor will do the work for us and ensure our safety.
But this folly of relinquishing our security to the hands of those devoted to our downfall conveyed to the Palestinians a simple message. Israel has neither the willingness nor the determination, and perhaps not even the power, to fight terrorism. Therefore there is no reason to fear the Israelis, especially if we handle our affairs wisely--in a way that will increase world support which is in any case already slanted in our favor.
Something similar transpired in Southern Lebanon. Due to the obsession with evacuation, Israel abruptly accepted the Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978 which up to then it had refused to accept for obvious and good reasons. Israel suddenly decided the UN would be the source of its salvation and would ensure Israel's security along the northern border against the Hizbullah. And if the UN would not accomplish this, then the Lebanese Army would. But that "army," which is not worthy of the name, never was a military body obeyed by the militias, certainly not the Shi'ites and their organizations, Amal and Hizbullah. To what should be no one's surprise, the Lebanese army has not deployed along the border and on the contrary, has allowed Hizbullah to maintain a presence there from which it attacks and harasses Israel.
It is worth remembering that in the past discussions of the Golan Heights, Rabin and his friends came up with the idea of stationing an American observer force there. We are beginning to be tempted to put our security responsibility in almost every sector on foreign forces.
The Arab view plays a significant role in evaluating the state of Israeli deterrence. When they witness the IDF, "the most powerful army in the Middle East," shamefully withdrawing from Lebanon under pressure from a few hundred zealous gunmen on the one hand, and from hysterical mothers and politicians on the other, it is no wonder that their leader, Sheik Nasrallah, derides us, comparing our strength to a spider web and calls on the Arabs, especially the Palestinians, to adopt Hizbullah as a role model. It is hard to remember any Arab leader who has articulated such profound derision and contempt towards Israel as Nasrallah has, and unfortunately there was more than a kernel of truth in his words. Here is what he said in Bint-Jebail in Southern Lebanon in May 2000:
"Israel may still have nuclear weapons
and heavy weaponry, but by God, it is weaker than
cobwebs. If Israel opts for aggression, it will pay a heavy
price. There was a time when we feared Israel's threats, its
[(Continued on p.5)]
Outpost - 4 - May 2001