[(Continued from p.5)]
Israel forfeited all of its impressive accomplishments on the ground, almost certainly because of its leaders' mental fatigue and lack of resolve as a result of the heavy losses incurred. Senior Israeli officials began making statements whose upshot was loss of faith in the use of force. Rabin, for example, expressed doubt concerning the use and purpose of wars because in their wake, Arab armies replenish their arsenals with more and higher quality weapons. Shimon Peres, blessed with a fertile imagination, went even further and viewed economy and technology as a valid substitute for the very existence and use of military force. (One of his more nonsensical statements was that "ten hotels on the Kinneret are preferable to ten military outposts"!) It is noteworthy that most of the leadership of the Left adamantly opposed the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in the summer of 1981. They were fearful of what the Arabs or the world might say or do in reaction to this preventive strike.The Israeli aversion to exercising power was also manifest in the wake of "Operation Peace of Galilee" in 1982. While then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin supported the notion that "war by choice" (in other words, initiating the use of military force when just and necessary) is proper, his opponents insisted that Israel may only participate in war where no other alternative presents itself (in other words, may respond only after being attacked and even then, only in limited fashion). But there are no less problems here than in the "war by choice" concept. First, implementing a preemptive or first strike, or even initiating a surprise attack, are among the basic "principles of war" and of ensuring success therein, certainly in the context of a conflict between the few and the many, Israel's perennial situation. Second, adoption of the "war of no alternative" concept pulls the carpet out from under the vital axiom of fighting spirit, because there will always be doubt or contentions as to whether or not an alternative existed. Third, the total rejection of the possibility of a "war by choice" critically damages Israel's deterrent capability, as the opponent has no reason to fear that Israel might surprise them or otherwise hinder their actions. Leaving the initiative solely to the enemy is an intolerable blunder and a prescription for strategic disaster.
The "peace process" both magnified the Israeli reluctance to exercise force and increased doubts regarding its effectiveness. Indeed, it cast doubt on the validity of almost all pillars of Israel's defense doctrine. Objections were raised not only to the exercise of power but also to one of its most conspicuous goals, i.e., "conquest of territory." The conquest of land (together with the "destruction of enemy forces") was a central tenet of Israeli defense theory, and for good reason. This was due to the imperative dictated by the lack of "strategic depth" (i.e. defensive territory), the need to shift the war to enemy territory and to make clear the price to the enemy through IDF victory on its soil. But now the claim was that "expansive" territories held by Israel (Judea, Samaria, Gaza) were neither a guarantee against an Arab war initiative nor a formula for tranquility.
The principle of "conquering territory" in war is directly related to another important principle of Israeli defense theory--"taking the offense." While on the strategic level Israel opted to maintain the status quo, on the operative-tactical level, we emphasized the offensive over the defensive because victory, crucial for the few facing the hostile many, could only be achieved in this way. But now Israel has abandoned the dictum of taking the offense and has adopted the defensive option on the one hand, and the path of restraint and reserve on the other. Israel today is even ready to compromise with a war of attrition, something very dangerous for its deterrence posture.
The reluctance of Israeli leadership and society to exert force was evident in the Gulf War, when most of the population supported restraint. In Lebanon, instead of initiating, attacking, and winning, the IDF fortified itself in bunkers and clumsy outposts and prepared to be fired upon. We even seemed to come to terms with katyusha fire on the Galilee, and at any rate made no attempt to fundamentally uproot the phenomenon. The name of the game was fortification and restraint and not deterring the enemy.
In the present mini-war in Judea, Samaria
and Gaza, the phenomenon is reaching new heights.
Instead of deterring the Palestinians, we fortify and dig in
right and left in outposts, settlements, vehicles and more. One
of the most pathetic manifestations is in the paving of
[(Continued on p.7)]
For the Record: Outpost on Oslo- $5.95
Lone Wolf: A Two-Volume Biography of Vladimir (Ze'ev)
Jabotinsky - by Shmuel Katz - $50.00
(New members: membership dues plus $25.00)
The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons,
and Deterrence - by Avigdor Haskelkorn - $21.00
The Jewish Wars
by Edward Alexander - $19.95 (non-members: $24.95)
A Matter of Priorities: Labor Zionism and the
Plight of Soviet Jewry, 1917-1996
by Geoffrey Martin & Natan Herzl - $4.95
Shimon Says: Shimon Peres in His Own Words
$3.95 (non-members: $4.95)
Should America "Guarantee" Israel's Safety?
by Dr. Irving Moskowitz - $3.95 (non-members: $4.95)
Order from:
AFSI - 1623 Third Ave., # 205 - New York, N.Y. 10128
Outpost - 6 - April 2001