[(Continued from p.3)]
south) served as inspiration to the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to begin the intifada in late 1987. In its early days, the IDF was certain that it could quell the uprising, and there were periods during the intifada when that seemed to be the case. However, the IDF did not succeed in crushing the intifada and then the Israeli leadership changed its tune: "The solution is political and not military." The fact is that the intifada eventually led the Rabin government to break the taboo, i.e., to recognize the PLO and reach the Oslo Accords in 1993, something which neither he, nor many others before him, ever dreamed of doing.For the first time in the long history of the conflict with Israel, it was the Palestinians who emerged from their primitive struggle (riots, stones, Molotov cocktails, deployment of women and children, and the like) having the advantage. They succeeded in accomplishing something which the Arab armies were never able to accomplish--to force Israel's hand and to effect a quantum change in its policy. Israel, which said loftily over the years that the Arabs would not achieve their goals with force and violence (not to mention that Israel would not speak to the PLO), surrendered to violence and proved to its perpetrators that it pays dividends. Once the Palestinians succeeded, Israel's deterrent capability suffered a devastating blow.
Israel's deterrence absorbed another blow in the Gulf War of 1990-91 (Operation Desert Storm), when approximately 40 el-Husseini surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) were launched from Iraq. Despite the fact that the country was paralyzed for about 40 days and its residents were forced to shut themselves into sealed rooms, wrap themselves in plastic sheets and don gas masks or to peripatetically wander to places considered safer, Israel neither defended itself nor reacted. For the first time in the history of the State of Israel, it was attacked in a war and did not exercise suitable power. True, there were mitigating circumstances contributing to restraint: the Western coalition led by the United States fought against and significantly weakened the Iraqi forces, so that, in practice, others did Israel's work for it. In addition, the United States forcefully badgered Israel into non-intervention for fear that the coalition would dissolve. Nevertheless, the Israeli restraint further weakened Israel's deterrence capability. Its neighbors saw Israel being forced to withstand bombing and not respond. In our opinion, an Israeli reaction was mandatory, if for no other reason than to display its deterrence capability at the end of the war in the region from which the ground-to-ground missiles were launched. Briefly stated, the Gulf War was not Israel's finest moment in general, and in the area of deterrence in particular, despite the fact that polls indicated that the majority of the public supported the policy of restraint.
An additional failure of Israeli deterrence was in the conflict with Hizbullah in Lebanon in recent years. Yes, it is difficult to wage war against an enemy of that sort, evasive and reliant on the local population. But the IDF had options at its disposal to overcome Hizbullah if not directly, then through an "indirect approach," by exerting military pressure against the responsible authorities in Lebanon and the Syrian army which dominates it. This is precisely the way in which Israel acted in past years against Palestinian terrorism, i.e. against the countries which hosted and supported it.
But at some point in time, the Israeli government and the IDF decided that there is no reason or no desire to prevail in the conflict in Lebanon, once again using the prattle that "the solution to such a struggle is political, not military." Add to that the phenomenon of the "Four Mothers" who exerted public pressure against remaining in Lebanon and the distance to withdrawal was short. Since there was no "partner" on the other side with whom to sign a withdrawal agreeement, Israel implemented a unilateral withdrawal in late May 2000. It was a frantic, humiliating flight of a defeated army which abandoned weapons and equipment and comrades-in-arms--the South Lebanese Army. There is no doubt that the Israeli deterrence capability incurred damage whose gravity is difficult to assess. Some of the results can be seen in the abduction of three IDF soldiers in early October 2000 and in continuing attacks and open disdain of Israel by Hizbullah.
It is no wonder, therefore, that Israeli deterrence operates not at all in the bloody conflict or mini-war (the al-Aqsa intifada in Arab terminology), which erupted in late September 2000. The fact that Israel was employing weapon systems (attack helicopters, advanced tanks, and missiles) in this confrontation which were not previously used has not discouraged the Palestinians from pursuing the path of violence and terrorism. They most certainly rely on the precedent that despite the use of such weaponry in Lebanon, Israel was forced by Hizbullah into a humiliating unilateral withdrawal due to the exclusive employment of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. When the Palestinians take this and add it to the success of their first intifada, and can be sure that they will not be pushed back, i.e. lose ground and assets already in their possession, they are not fearful of Israel.
We have framed the causes of the decline
of deterrence into three categories: causes connected
to the IDF, causes connected to Israeli leadership and
society, and causes connected to the Arab standpoint.
All of them pose a great potential threat to the future and
[(Continued on p.5)]
Outpost - 4 - April 2001