Deterrence is the ability to dissuade an enemy/opponent from carrying out hostile acts by conveying to him that it is not worth his while, that the cost outweighs the benefits. Essentially, the purpose of deterrence is to prevent war and violence. Deterrence is symbiotically tied to the alternative, that is, the ability to decisively win the war if the enemy chooses to attack. Without the ability to emerge victorious from a confrontation, or to wreak unbearable damage upon the enemy, the concept of deterrence is meaningless. Also central to deterrence is the image and credibility of the deterring side. If the deterred side senses that the deterring party is not determined to implement its deterrence capability through the use of its ability to win decisively, the chance that the deterrence capability will discourage anyone is nearly nonexistent. The check of deterrence must not bounce.

It is impossible to address the decline of Israeli deterrence before establishing why it is extremely important in our circumstances. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict over Israel's very existence in an Arab-Muslim region. It is a conflict over historical and national rights. It is a conflict between religions and values, tradition, national honor, and more. The conflict over land is just a symptom of all the others. In addition, Israel's position as the "few versus the many" (there is huge demographic imbalance, an imbalance in the ratio of forces, the size of countries, the existence--or nonexistence--of strategic depth, economic resources, the ability to absorb losses etc.) makes this conflict the most intractable in the world. With the conflict so intense, it is difficult to imagine it being resolved unless the Arab societies surrounding us change. In Israel's situation, given the profundity of the conflict, the dangerous, unstable strategic environment and the diplomatic strategic conditions that do not favor it (Israel must always fear the intervention of foreign powers against its interests), the Jewish state simply has no choice other than to continue to rely on a viable deterrence capability and the ability to win wars decisively.

A Series of Blows to Israel's Deterrent Power

The Yom Kippur War in 1973 marks the clear beginning of the deterioration of Israel's deterrence capability. Despite initial Arab military accomplishments, the Israel Defense Forces turned the tide, and achieved outstanding victories, but only on the tactical-operational level. On the strategic level we agreed to relinquish (due to lack of resolve and weariness of spirit) all of our territorial gains and more. Our enemies could conclude that even in a comprehensive war, limited in its territorial aims, they could count on significant strategic accomplishments including the involvement of the superpowers. And what was even worse--for the first time, the IDF was not perceived as invincible. When a war concludes with political-strategic accomplishments, even though their army was vanquished, it proves to the Arabs that it was worthwhile, and thereby severely damages Israel's deterrent capability.

Without the ability to emerge victorious from a confrontation, the concept of deterrence is meaningless.

The second blow came with "Operation Peace for Galilee," or the Lebanon war, which began in June 1982. In terms of the war in the air, the Israel Air Force achieved an overwhelming victory. The Arabs, who since the 1973 war imagined that they had discovered the formula for neutralizing the IAF through the use of anti-aircraft missiles, were astounded to learn that an overwhelming response had been presented. No doubt, therefore, that in the air, not only was the deterrence capability maintained but it was rehabilitated and enhanced.

The ground war was another story. The IDF ground forces ultimately did induce the Syrians to withdraw from their deployment in the Lebanon Valley and Beirut, but it was not accomplished quickly or elegantly; in fact, the IDF displayed clumsiness in its ground maneuvers and fulfilled its missions with difficulty. But even worse, the difficulties encountered in confronting the terrorism and guerrilla warrfare staged by the Shi'ite organizations "Amal" and "Hizbullah" provided a highly negative role model, especially for the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Once again, the IDF projected the image of an army which can be defeated and forced to withdraw when engaged in low intensity warfare waged with tenacity and determination.

There is actually little doubt that the success of the Shi'ite organizations in the utilization of terrorist and guerilla tactics to force the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon in 1985 (except from a narrow security zone in the

April 2001               - 3 -               Outpost