The positive effect such a turn of events would have on the Jewish state's standing in the international arena goes without saying. Israel, as part of a powerful strategic combination, would cease to be the trampled doormat of the European community. The Europeans, now located within ballistic-missile range of the Arab countries on the one hand, and threatened by Moslem irredentism in their own lands on the other (the Moslem minority in France constitutes 7% of the population today and is growing rapidly) are well aware of the Islamic threat. The Europeans, who have a well-developed historical memory, do not forget that the defeat of Richard the Lionhearted by Saladin at the end of the 12th century brought Islam to the gates of Vienna by the 17th century. Consequently, Europe is a natural ally for Israel; in order to achieve this, however, Israel must project power, resolve, and strategic backing of other regional powers such as India and Turkey.

Consummation of the "peace process" means certain war.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States Congress became the most significant power center in the world. In contrast to the President, who represents short-term American interests, if for no other reason than the time limitations of his term in which he must produce immediate results, the strategic thinking of Congress is long term--hence the basic difference in its attitude toward Israel. Whereas Presidents Bush and Clinton dealt and are dealing with the dismemberment of Israel and its relegation to the 1967 borders, a sweeping majority in the Congress, the authentic representative of the American public, adamantly opposes this policy. This is because a strong Israel with safe borders is a clear American interest....

Thus, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a historic window of opportunity opened for Israel. The disastrous "peace process" --designed to emasculate the Jewish state and transform it from a regional power to a divided entity on the thresh old of existential demise-- if it were to be realized, would seal the window of opportunity forever. Strategic cooperation depends on the strength of the ally. What possible interest could Turkey or India have in a shriveled Israeli entity with suicidal tendencies? The U.S. Congress, the last stronghold still supporting Israel, will abandon it as well. And the abandonment will be justifiable, since one cannot expect the average congressman or senator to be more Zionist than the Israelis themselves.

What can Israel do to escape the murderous trap into which it has fallen? Defining an alternative political-diplomatic strategy is conditioned first and foremost on acceptance of the basic assumption that the goal of the Arab world is to reduce Israel to the 1949 lines in order to make it easier to destroy the Jewish state. Therefore, consummation of the "peace process" means certain war, and this will take place under conditions, topographical and strategic, of decisive Israeli inferiority.

On the other hand, if the process is stopped now, the probability of war, though still very high, is not absolutely certain. And if war does break out, Israel's chances of winning will be immeasurably higher in the present borders.

Hence, stopping the process is an existential necessity for Israel. It is true that withdrawing from the "peace process" would mean paying an international political price. However, this price, high as it might be, would be immeasurably preferable to the existential danger entailed in retreat to the 1949 lines.

Israel will have to struggle in four arenas at one and the same time....The four arenas of struggle are as follows:

l. The possibility of war

One must assume that the Arab world will not come to terms with an Israeli decision to freeze the present situation and to stop "the momentum meant to restore Israel to its natural size," as Anwar Sadat used to put it. Therefore a high probability of war exists. Israel must get ready to face it. For that purpose, the Israeli army must recover its deterrent image, which has been severely damaged, and a military doctrine must be clearly defined to deal with the anticipated conflict, which will mainly consist of the enemy's launching surface-to-surface missiles at the Israeli home front.

Tough deterrence -- while Israel still possesses strategic assets in Judea-Samaria and the Golan Heights, while the techno-scientific gap between Israel and her enemies is still considerable and the level of armament in weapons of mass destruction in the Arab states has not yet reached the stage of critical mass -- might deter the Arabs from an adventure that would be

[(Continued on p.9)]

Outpost               - 8 -               February 2000