[(Continued from p.6)]
Israeli targets. Local Police commanders were, in fact, given orders, at times, to re-establish law and order and restore the calm -- but their actions often indicated that they felt (or rather, realized) that such instructions do not fit in with Arafat's broader support for the struggle and were therefore half-hearted in carrying them out.In many cases, Palestinian Policemen took an active part in the fighting, in an organized fashion or as individuals; and there is no evidence (now or on previous occasions) of disciplinary action being taken against those who did so. There is evidence, moreover, as to the complicity of Preventive Security operatives -- particularly in the Gaza Strip -- in armed attacks on the I.D.F. and on Israelis.
Perhaps the most serious event for which the Palestinian police bears a major share of responsibility in the recent crisis was the lynching of two Israeli reserve soldiers in Ramallah on October 12, 2000. It was indeed a mob which killed them and mutilated their bodies: but it had been the Palestinian policemen who captured them, brought them into the Police Headquarters at the center of town, and then put up only a half-hearted effort to prevent the attack. So far, the P.A. did nothing to punish those responsible.
The Palestinian Security Organs -- such as Preventive Security, as well as the General Intelligence Service and its arm in the West Bank, under Colonel Tawfiq Tirawi, have been involved in other violent actions in breach of the agreements, such as the abduction or unlawful arrest of Israeli citizens (in some cases, Israeli Arabs suspected as "collaborators"), and the murder of Palestinian real estate dealers (suspected of selling land to Jews).
Another salient case (outside the context of any specific local confrontation) -- in which a senior P.A. official acted, in effect, as a terrorist -- involved BG (now a Major General) Ghazi Jabali, the Commander of the Police Force, issuing orders for an attack -- actually carried out by two of his colonels -- on settlers in the West Bank in July 1997 (Yediot Ahronot, July 18 1997).
Moreover, at various "friction points" (e.g. events in Bethlehem, March 1998; the Gush Katif road in the Gaza Strip, July 1998; Khan Yunis, February 1999), Palestinian policemen and members of other organized forces drew weapons in support of violent demonstrators or in direct confrontations with the I.D.F [Israel Defense Forces]....
In terms of its impact on Israeli society, and hence on the prospects for building the necessary bridges of trust and cooperation, it was the Palestinian failure to comply with its commitments on restraining terrorism -- and in fact, the periodic courting of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad as partners in the struggle which left the most bitter legacy in 1995-1996, and now seems to be repeating itself....
Throughout the early period of consolidation in the areas under its control -- from May 1994 onwards -- Arafat resisted constant pressures by Israel to restrain the Hamas and restrict, if not destroy, the infrastructure established by the terrorist organization. The failure to do so put in question the basic underpinnings of the Oslo accords; and its most evident outcome was a sharp rise in the number of Israelis who fell prey to terrorist attacks during this period.
Arafat, throughout this period, continued to embrace the Hamas, in political terms; when the "Engineer" Yahia Ayyash -- the man behind many of the worst Hamas attacks -- was killed, he came to pay his condolences to the Hamas leader Mahmud al-Zahhar (Al-Quds, January 6, 1996). Meanwhile, the Preventive Security Chief in Gaza, Dahlan, apparently kept his contacts with the leader of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam forces -- the Hamas military arm -- Muhammad Deif (a childhood friend) and broke them off only after the second bombing in Jerusalem. (Ha'aretz, March 10 1996).
Palestinian non-compliance encompasses broad aspects of everyday practice, from school texts to car theft.
It was the political fallout (including intense international pressure) following the suicide bombings of February-March 1996 which finally led to a break in this pattern, as the P.A. belatedly awoke to the consequences of its conduct on this issue.
Still, in March 1997 there was once again more than a hint of a "Green Light" from Arafat to the Hamas, prior to the bombing in Tel Aviv...: this is implicit in the statement made by a Hamas-affiliated member of Arafat's Cabinet, Imad Faluji, to an American paper (Miami Herald, April 5, 1997).
The next few years, in which the question of "reciprocity" took center stage in the negotiations (culminating in the Wye River memorandum and the attached security understandings), were marked by mixed results -- the pressure for security cooperation did lead to partial compliance, but no real steps were taken against terrorist infrastructures; and the "revolving door" practice -- i.e., the release of active terrorists and Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad operators, long before they had served their terms -- became (and remained) a constant problem. The P.A., since its establishment, has in fact taken a consistently lax attitude towards terror activists. It did act, in periodic bursts, to arrest some of them, and to respond (until the recent crisis broke; very rarely since) to specific information from Israel or other (mostly U.S.) sources on actual attacks being planned; but most of the time:
* Its policy was to incorporate ex-Fatah
"Hawks" within the various security organs. In May 1994, as
it entered Gaza, the P.A. commissioned as
policemen, among others, two brothers -- Rajih and Amru Abu Sitah
[(Continued on p.8)]
December 2000 - 7 - Outpost