[(Continued from p.9)]
Following Israel's decision to evacuate Joseph's Tomb -- so as to avoid further bloodshed -- it was looted, torched and in parts dismantled. Local Palestinian commanders openly stated that no Israeli would set foot there again; and indeed, one man who apparently wanted to visit the site was brutally murdered, and a group of hikers (including women and children) "suspected" of coming too near to the Tomb, were shot at, wounded and one was killed.Moreover, in October 12, 2000, Palestinian Police failed to prevent the desecration of the ancient "Shalom al Yisrael" synagogue in the Jericho area, which was looted and partly torched.
Belated attempts to undo the damage seem to have been made largely because of the severe international reaction to these failures to uphold Palestinian commitments (let alone recognize Jewish religious sensitivities: an atmosphere made worse by the crude arguments, used by Arafat and others to dismiss any Jewish claim to the Temple Mount).
The massive Palestinian thefts of Israeli cars is sanctioned by the Palestinian Police.
What does this all add up to?
The very nature of the Oslo Process assumed that over time, if not overnight, a new reality of bilateral relations would be created on the ground, with an open prospect to Palestinian sovereignty in sight. This would lead Arafat away from the option of violence and "struggle" (which he and others in the P.A. continued to articulate). This has not happened.
In a recent article, written as a letter to Arafat ("Time to Choose, Yasir," October 6, 2000) the American columnist Thomas Friedman called upon him to choose who he is: a peacemaker or an unregenerate revolutionary.
The evidence presented in this document -- along with his conduct in recent weeks -- strongly suggests that this choice has not yet been made; or else that the P.A. leadership has opted for violence, in response to the call for "hard decisions" placed upon it after the Camp David Summit. Arafat had let it be known to the Fatah movement, his key political and paramilitary instrument, that he expects them to act (and take up arms); and this action was supported and sustained by the heated intensity of the incitement dished out by Palestinian media organs -- papers, radio stations, and above all by Palestinian Television.
The option of an armed "intifada" has been long in preparation, both in terms of planning (as overall evidence, including the indications from intelligence sources, has been showing well before the actual outbreak of violence), and in the manner in which Palestinian and Arab public opinion was worked up against the possibility of compromise on the key issues.
Another assumption which sustained the process was the hope that as the P.A. became an established "government", its choices in the future would be colored by the need to provide for the best interests of the governed -- even if the evolution of democratic politics in the P.A. was far from complete.
This assumption, too, has been brought into question over time, and shattered by recent events. In addition to broader problems arising from the P.A.'s mismanagement of public and economic affairs, specific aspects of its policy towards Israel -- above all, the failure to deliver on the restraint of terrorism and terrorist infrastructure -- obliged Israel to apply restrictions on the freedom of movement and employment of Palestinians. It is particularly young people who are easily mobilized by Hamas.
It was easy enough for the P.A. to blame Israel for the consequences of these restrictions; but at their root was Arafat's persistent ambiguity on his security commitments (and indeed, when these were more strictly adhered to -- under pressure from outside -- economic life in the Palestinian governed areas improved significantly, as in 1998-1999).
The Palestinian leadership's disregard for the welfare of the governed has now risen to a new level. The thrust of Palestinian propaganda in recent weeks is unmistakable: suffering, particularly the death of children, has become instrumental as its rallying cry to its own people and the Arab world. Thus, it has systematically exploited the tragic death of the child Muhammad al-Durra at Netzarim junction -- where he was caught in the crossfire of a gun battle, the P.A. deliberately misrepresenting his death as a "cold-blooded execution," often several times an hour throughout its television broadcasts.
In effect, this strategy feeds upon further suffering and disruption -- including self-induced economic hardships, while Israel actually seeks to ensure supplies to the P.A. areas. The tactics of the Fatah "Tanzim" (militia) are also apparently designed to bring about further suffering upon civilian populations -- as made evident by their use of Beit Jala -- a Christian community -- to fire on Gilo in Jerusalem, with the full knowledge of the consequences for the (unwilling) residents.
At the core of the present strategy, as clearly
[(Continued on p.11)]
Outpost - 10 - December 2000