For the failure of political Zionism shall prove a point long contested. The haredim who insisted we should not have established a secular state, should not have "forced the end of days," can say they were right. The secular Zionists lost their children, lost the future, lost the state. The alienation between the religious and secular Zionist camps will grow ever greater, not to speak of the chasm between both of these and those who designate themselves as "post-Zionist." In this climate, aliyah will effectively cease.

Something profound is being lost--something within: the idealism, the willingness to sacrifice, the readiness to fight and die. Israelis have been sold la dolce vita, a pleasure-seeking pop culture. Our children have been trained to tolerance, democracy and love of our enemies, while our enemies cultivate enmity and hate and their form of "patriotism." Democracy has become Israel's new religion, even as the attitudes fostered toward the religious are anything but democratic.

We have allowed an upside-down state of affairs to develop. Our own patriotism is called chauvinism, racism, old-fashioned, passe. Arab patriotism is admirable, an assertion of legitimate rights. They, not we, are cast as "liberators"; we, not they, are cast as

Something profound is being lost--something within: the idealism, the willingness to sacrifice, the readiness to fight and die.

Let it be clear, too, that even the most "left" among us will come to feel a sense of loss, of emptiness, of being routed, vanquished, helpless. Though the left publicly claims the establishment of a PLO state will satisfy the Arabs and there will be no more wars, at some level its members must know the probability of that happening is low indeed. For it is the Arabs, not we, who are now committed to the idea of an undivided Land of Israel--Eretz Yisrael Hashlema. We who denigrated the concept now face it again in our political opponents. They consider that "liberating Palestine is a national obligation" (Article 5 of the PLO Covenant) demanding support of the entire Arab nation.

Those who expect peace, accomodation and coexistence must realize that the Arabs do not share these goals. Rather they state as their goals (Article 12) the "complete liberation of Palestine, and the eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence," which they intend to accomplish by "armed public revolution" (Article 17). We ignore at our peril the emphasis in the covenant on "revolution." The Covenant refers here to Israel's own Arabs; it is they who are candidates for "revolution." Thus, not only war but also revolutionary insurrection, becomes inevitable. And revolution is terrorism.

Yet there are Israelis, as well as so-called "friends abroad," who speak to us in terms of "benefits" to us from a PLO state. Some of them argue that if, against their expectations (vain hopes?) there should be a war, then--but only then--they will have the right to ask our soldiers to fight. As if it is not always the duty, right, and privilege of soldiers to defend their homeland.

Others suggest that Israel will benefit from a positive economic fallout resulting from reduced military expenses, increased tourism and trade, and greater international investment. Economists like Professor Eliyahu Kanovsky have shown the fallacy of this expectation, but from a psychological point of view, it is also unfounded. We can expect a reduction in the energy and productivity levels of Israeli citizens resulting from the inevitable depression and demoralization. Furthermore, we can predict a decrease in the willingness of foreigners to invest in Israel, a state whose survivability will have been seriously compromised. People bet on a nation in ascendancy, not on a nation in process of dissolution.

Furthermore, we can expect a decrease in general tourism, for, as Israel ceases to be the promised land of the Bible, ceases to be the reclaimed, liberated Jewish homeland, both Jewish and international interest can be expected to wane. There are nicer beaches and lower prices elsewhere.

Now let us look at what a PLO state means for several sectors of the population:

For the religious, the establishment of a Palestinian states poses an impossible conundrum. For the believing Jew, God's promise that this land is theirs and their children's forever cannot be reconciled with the establishment of a foreign entity on this land. Indeed, for the thousands of years of exile, and before, there has never been a kingdom or political entity in the Land of Israel that was not ours. Establishment of a PLO state then inevitably produces dissonance and anxiety, and puts a basic belief system in question. While the dissonance can be resolved in various ways, one possibility

Outpost               - 4 -               June-July 2000