David Gerstman
Baltimore Maryland
11/11/97
The New York Times,
Letters Editor
To the editor:
When Israel destroyed the Iraqi reactor in 1981 the world was
nearly unanimous in its criticism of the Jewish state. Among the voices
in the choir of condemnations was that of the New York Times editorial
page. Given subsequent actions of Saddam Hussein (his brutal annexation
of Kuwait, his war against the Kurds, his acquisition of arms of mass
destruction), it should be clear in retrospect that Israel's decisive
action was not only commendable, but served the cause of world peace and
stability in the Middle East.
One would think, having been chastised by events anyone at the
New York Times would be a bit circumspect in advising Israel how to deal
with Saddam. Not so. Thomas Friedman, in an otherwise responsible essay
condemning the world's lack of will in dealing with Iraq ("With Friends
Like These ….", November 10, 1997), found the need to lecture Israel on
how it could help the situation,
"Israel is another ally that should take stock. Unlike the
Europeans, Israel knows exactly who Saddam is. Israel has a fundamental
interest in the coalition's holding firm against him, particularly the
Arabs. The ability of Arab leaders to do so will be influenced in part by
public opinion, and already Saddam is playing on that, saying the U.S.
wants to bully him but won't lift a finger to pressure Benjamin
Netanyahu. Mr. Netanyahu doesn't have to give the Palestinians a state
tomorrow, just to satisfy the Arab street. But he could buy the U.S. a
lot more room to maneuver -- and therefore improve Israel's overall
strategic situation -- by implementing the long-delayed redeployment of
Israeli forces from the West Bank in return for Palestinian concessions."
That's right, Netanyahu "could . . . improve Israel's overall
strategic situation -- by implementing the long-delayed redeployment of
Israeli forces from the West Bank . . ." This would give the "U.S. . .
. a lot more room to maneuver." Friedman feels that Israeli concessions
would buy the U.S. more credibility in the Arab world. It's a nice
thought, but it's not borne out by experience.
During the Gulf War, President Bush made sure that Israel
wouldn't defend itself lest any Arab State drop its support for the
anti-Iraq coalition. Arab hate for the Jewish state was stronger than
any fear of Saddam. In the wake of the successful eviction of Iraq from
Kuwait, the Arab world didn't show much gratitude for American
protection. When Bush successfully led the UN to revoke the offensive
"Zionism is Racism" resolution, not a single Arab state voted to repeal
the resolution. (Egypt and Kuwait abstained from the vote; effectively
voting to maintain the measure.)
Even though past behavior may not be predictive of future
actions, the present hardly suggests that further concessions to the
Palestinian Authority (PA) will improve Israel's strategic position. Not
only did Yasser Arafat rhetorically support Iraq's grab of Kuwait seven
years ago, currently, according to Iraqi dissident sources, the PA is
using its embassy in Baghdad to hide evidence of Iraqi development of
illegal chemical weapons. Granted this charge, giving the PA more land
or legitimacy would serve to strengthen one of Iraq's allies and would be
counterproductive.
Another part of the calculus that Friedman should consider is
that if the PA has access to this information, what would it be doing
with the knowledge it would undoubtedly gain? Would it simply ignore
this knowledge? Or would it use it to have one more weapon against
Israel? Yasser Arafat may not have the army Saddam has; he may not
possess the same amount of land that Saddam does; but every bit of
evidence suggests that he every bit the despot Saddam is. For this
reason alone it would be prudent to treat Arafat and the PA with at least
a bit of suspicion. Prudence, though, is not what Friedman wants. The
opportunity to criticize Israel gratuitously for not being sufficiently
forthcoming seems to be his only agenda here.
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